




MERRITT E. MCALISTER† 
Significant numbers of federal appellate decisions are missing from Westlaw and 
Lexis. Bloomberg Law has similar, and similarly incomplete, coverage. Across most of 
the circuits, at least twenty-five percent or more of the courts’ self-reported merits 
terminations, which predominately include unpublished decisions, never make their 
way to these databases. 
Since at least !""#, when a rule change permitted citation to unpublished 
decisions from the federal appellate courts, scholars widely have assumed that 
commercial databases for legal research capture nearly all—if not, in fact, all—
federal appellate merits decisions whether designated for publication in the Federal 
Reporter or not. Although scholars have long considered how publication practices 
shape access to court decisions—especially at the district court level—this is the $rst 
work to analyze and document widespread shortcomings of commercial database 
access to unpublished federal appellate decisions. 
Unraveling the widely held assumption of access raises concerns over our ability to 
navigate and uncover useful precedent and to determine basic information about how 
the federal system administers justice. The solution is as simple as it is 
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transformational: all final judge-issued decisions from the federal appellate courts 
should be publicly and freely accessible on court websites. The courts themselves must 
be responsible for this change. How they issue decisions is the likely cause of missing 
decisions, and market pressures may not create sufficient incentive for private actors—
the databases themselves—to undertake the steps necessary to recover what’s missing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is the story of Jones v. Gelb.1 Antonio Jones alleged that a corrections 
o+cer used pepper spray on him multiple times while Mr. Jones was already 
subdued; he was seated on the ground in full leg and arm restraints and had 
just undergone knee surgery.2 The o+cer told Mr. Jones he wanted him to 
“die quick[ly].”3 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
a video was consistent with Mr. Jones’s description of the events but was not 
conclusive; on appeal, that court vacated the summary judgment decision 
granting the o+cer quali,ed immunity.4 In ruling for Mr. Jones, the First 
Circuit cited law from other circuits to support its conclusion that a jury could 
 
1 No. !&-!'(" (!st Cir. Mar. $), $"!*) (on +le with author). 
2 Id., slip op. at $. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. The court a,rmed the grant of summary judgment to another o,cer who had used “de 
minimis force” on Mr. Jones during the same incident, other o,cers for their involvement in a 
separate incident, and a nurse who had not been “properly served or identi+ed.” Id. at ). 
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decide the o+cer had acted maliciously and therefore was not entitled to 
immunity from trial.5 Jones arguably makes new law—or at least clari,es 
existing law—in the First Circuit.6 
And yet you will not ,nd Jones on Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg Law.7 
Jones is not an exception—at least not in that respect. (It is an exceptional 
result for a prisoner pursuing a civil rights claim.8) For more than a decade, 
federal appellate courts have been screening—wittingly or not—thousands of 
decisions like Mr. Jones’s case from the bench and bar. The decision in Mr. 
Jones’s pro se appeal is just one example of what’s missing. 
There were nearly !",""" federal appellate “merits terminations”—a term 
explained and de,ned in Part I9—issued during the same twelve-month 
period that, like Mr. Jones’s, never made it to Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg 
Law.10 Out of approximately (',""" such decisions issued during that period, 
approximately twenty-seven percent are missing from the most popular and 
powerful commercial legal databases.11 
That time period is not an aberration. Access to merits terminations in 
federal appellate proceedings has been poor—or, at best, inconsistent—for at 
least the last decade.12 Depending on the year, as many as forty percent of 
merits terminations from the federal appellate courts are missing from 
commercial databases. The First Circuit is not an outlier, either. Although 
the First Circuit’s coverage gap is among the most substantial, during the 
same period the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Sixth 
Circuit both had coverage gaps similar to that of the First Circuit.13 
 
5 Id. at $-) (citing Tenth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit precedent); see also infra 
notes !*'–!*% and accompanying text (discussing skewing e#ects of missing decisions on civil rights 
law in particular). 
6 See infra notes !*-–!*& and accompanying text (discussing cases decided after Jones). 
7 Jones is available, as are all “missing decisions,” on PACER, the federal courts’ publicly 
accessible electronic docketing system. For more on the PACER system, see infra note '* and 
accompanying text (discussing problems with PACER). 
8 Nationally, less than five percent of “private prisoner” appeals (a category that includes nonfederal 
prisoners like Mr. Jones) were reversed during the same twelve-month period. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.B-& ($"!*) [hereinafter $"!* JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS]; see also id. tbl.B-!A (expanding on category of “private prisoner” petitions). The Administrative 
Office classifies decisions affirmed in part and reversed in part as “affirmed.” Id. tbl.B-& n.!. The First Circuit 
did not reverse or remand any other state prisoner’s appeal during the same period. Id. tbl.B-&. All 
Administrative Office data tables discussed in this Article may be found on the Administrative Office 
website. Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-
statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/SL$J-M)-W]. 
9 See infra notes *)–($ and accompanying text (explaining and de+ning “merits terminations”). 
10 See infra Table !. 
11 See infra Figure !. Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law, in contrast, are among the “most 
trusted” legal commercial databases. Paul Hellyer, Evaluating Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite for Case 
Validation Accuracy, !!" L. LIBR. J. --%, --% ($"!(). 
12 See infra Appendix A (collecting data on missing decisions dating back to September )", $""(). 
13 See infra Figure ). 
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Concerns over coverage of federal court decisions on commercial 
databases are not new—and there is a rich literature on these issues, especially 
at the federal district-court level.14 Christina L. Boyd, Pauline Kim, and 
Margo Schlanger’s recent work reveals “vast variation in visibility” into 
district court work depending on the research tool used.15 Elizabeth 
McCuskey’s earlier work on access to district court decisions identi,ed what 
she termed “submerged precedent” at the district-court level—”reasoned 
opinions available only on court dockets, and not on the Westlaw and Lexis 
commercial databases.”16 Building on McCuskey’s work, Michael Kagan, 
Rebecca Gill, and Fatma Marouf challenged assumptions about access to 
federal appellate decisions in the immigration context.17 They revealed that 
many—if not nearly all—decisions resolving immigration appeals were 
missing from Westlaw (and to a lesser extent, Lexis).18 
But this Article is the first to show that the problem of access to circuit-
level decisions is much bigger than anyone—including the commercial 
databases19—has realized. For at least a decade or more, scholars have thought 
(even while questioning district court access) that “[a]ll reasoned [federal] 
 
14 See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Pauline T. Kim & Margo Schlanger, Mapping the Iceberg: The 
Impact of Data Sources on the Study of District Courts, !* J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. -'', -'' ($"$") 
(“[T]he work of federal district courts looks di#erent depending on whether research relies on 
published opinions, on opinions available on Westlaw or Lexis . . . or on more comprehensive data 
available on PACER . . . .”); David A. Ho#man, Alan J. Izenman & Je#rey R. Lidicker, Docketology, 
District Courts, and Doctrine, (& WASH. U. L. REV. '(!, '('-(( ($""*) (challenging the assumption 
that commercial databases provide representative samples of district court decisions); Margo 
Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The 
Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, *& UMKC L. REV. !&), !&( ($""') (“[E]ven when judges have 
written opinions, and allowed those opinions to be published in print or on-line sources, such sources 
rarely tell the entire story of a litigation.”). 
15 Boyd et al., supra note !-, at -''. 
16 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, !' NEV. L.J. &!&, &!' ($"!') (evaluating 
accessibility of unpublished, yet reasoned district court decisions); see also Peter W. Martin, District 
Court Opinions that Remain Hidden Despite a Long-Standing Congressional Mandate of Transparency—
The Result of Judicial Autonomy and Systemic Indi!erence, !!" L. LIB. J. )"&, )!) ($"!() (describing the 
di,culty in +nding these unpublished decisions using the district courts’ websites). 
17 See Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill & Fatma Marouf, Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, !"' GEO. L.J. '(), '(&-(' ($"!() (establishing that many—and in some circuits, most—
unpublished decisions in immigration appeals are unavailable on Westlaw and, to a lesser extent, Lexis). 
18 See id. at '(& (“[W]e were surprised to find that many cases that PACER showed had been decided 
on substantive grounds did not appear when we looked for them in Westlaw or Lexis. . . . Westlaw includes 
almost none of them. Lexis is better, but it still is missing large numbers of these cases . . . .”). 
19 See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Eric Helland & Merritt McAlister, Measuring How Stock 
Ownership Affects Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, !") GEO. L.J. !!'), !!() n.%* ($"!&) (quoting e-
mail from Westlaw Reference Attorney, explaining that “I do not believe there are any U.S. Court of 
Appeals decisions that are not on Westlaw in some format, unless there would be some type of court 
order sealing it or ordering it not be made public. I would guess this would be a very rare situation.”). 
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appellate opinions are open to public view.”20 Although the courts have relied 
increasingly on so-called “unpublished decisions”21—decisions not designated 
for inclusion in the West Federal Reporter—academics and practitioners alike 
have long assumed that unpublished decisions were widely available on free 
court websites and in commercial databases.22 
The access problems we face for federal district court decisions also exist 
at the federal appellate level—albeit to a lesser extent. At no time over the last 
decade, have we had complete, navigable access to all reasoned or substantive 
decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals on Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg Law, 
or FDsys, the only government-run consolidated court opinions database.  
What is missing, then? The short answer: decisions from the appellate 
courts that are not available for free on court websites. Commercial databases 
largely depend on the courts themselves for access to the opinions and orders 
that ultimately populate their databases.23 If a decision is not on a free court 
website, it likely won’t end up in a commercial database (unless requested for 
inclusion by a database customer). “Missing decisions” are available on the 
publicly accessible federal court docketing database, PACER, but they are not 
available for free. The commercial databases do not routinely incur PACER 
fees to retrieve content; whatever appellate work product is locked away 
behind PACER’s paywall generally stays that way. 
The courts denominate many merits terminations as “opinions of the court,” 
a term of art that renders the decisions available for free through PACER,24 but 
they issue other terminations—denominated (at least in the First Circuit) as 
 
20 McCuskey, supra note !', at &!*; see also id. (“The current debate at the appellate level no 
longer questions public access to unpublished opinions, but now centers on appellate courts’ 
prerogative to label those opinions prospectively as +t for future precedential use.”); WILLIAM M. 
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS IN CRISIS &% ($"!)) (“Unpublished decisions are now available online and can be easily 
accessed and analyzed there.”); Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, '& 
UCLA L. REV. ("(, (!" n.$ ($"!() (“Although ‘nonprecedential’ and ‘unpublished’ can be used 
interchangeably, this Article prefers the term ‘nonprecedential’ given post-$""! publication of all 
opinions in West’s Federal Appendix.”); Robert A. Mead, “Unpublished” Opinions as the Bulk of the 
Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, %) 
LAW LIBR. J. &(%, &%& ($""!) (“Because Westlaw, LexisNexis, and court Web sites all include 
unpublished courts of appeals opinions in their databases, practitioners and the public now have 
access to these opinions regardless of whether they are published in the Federal Reporter.”). 
21 Today, approximately eighty-eight percent of merits terminations in the federal appellate 
courts are “unpublished.” ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. 
COURTS tbl.B-!$ ($"!() [hereinafter $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. 
22 See, e.g., Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent, 
- GREEN BAG $d !*, !( ($""") (“[T]here is really no such thing as an ‘unpublished opinion’ of a 
federal appellate court.”). 
23 See infra notes '%–*$ and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes *$, $)(–$-- and accompanying text (discussing written opinion designation 
and operation of the E-Government Act). Peter Martin has described this process at the district 
court level in detail. See generally Martin, supra note !'. 
!!"$ University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !!"! 
“judgments”—that are not available for free.25 How each panel resolves each 
appeal—whether by written opinion that will be widely available for free as an 
“opinion of the court” or by judgment locked away behind PACER’s paywall—is 
a decision left to each panel.26 At least some of these “judgments” (but certainly 
not all) are more substantive than the “judgment” label might suggest.27 
The discovery of missing unpublished decisions undermines a core 
assumption about the study of the federal appellate courts—namely, that we 
can easily access and navigate all substantive work of the federal appellate 
courts using existing technology. It is not now, and likely never has been, true 
that we have usable and navigable access to all of the substantive work of the 
federal appellate courts. That’s a concerning discovery for empiricists, who 
have been charged with overreliance on published federal appellate decisions 
for data and have warned of the pitfalls of failing to account for unpublished 
decisions.28 Reliance on commercial databases for unpublished decisions 
likewise carries a risk of sampling bias. 
For scholars of the federal courts, this Article describes a third tier of 
federal appellate decisions that has operated out of sight for well over a 
decade. We’ve long understood the federal appellate system to have two 
tracks or two tiers: a ,rst for the most “important” federal appellate cases 
resolved with published opinions, and a lesser, second tier for common 
disputes ending in unpublished decisions.29 But there may be an even lesser, 
third tier ,lled with hidden or missing unpublished decisions that never make 
their way to the commercial databases that scholars, practitioners, and courts 
use.30 These decisions’ relative invisibility renders them essentially useless to 
 
25 See infra notes !&$–!&' and accompanying text (describing First Circuit decisional issuance scheme). 
26 See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. )'."(b) (“As members of a panel prepare for argument, they shall give 
thought to the appropriate mode of disposition . . . . At conference the mode of disposition shall be 
discussed and, if feasible, agreed upon.”). 
27 Appendix B contains examples of several substantive judgments from the First Circuit. 
28 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt 
to Understand the Factors A!ecting Appellate Decisionmaking, &( DUKE L.J. !(%&, !(%%-!%"" ($""%) 
(“The omission of unpublished decisions [from empirical legal analyses] almost surely skews results 
in favor of +nding greater in.uence from extralegal factors.”). 
29 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: 
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, (! CORNELL L. REV. $*), $*&-*' (!%%') (describing how 
federal appellate triage gives rise to these “di#erent tracks of justice”); see also Penelope Pether, 
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, &' STAN. L. REV. !-)&, !-'"-
'! ($""-) (explaining the impact of two-tier appellate review system on vulnerable and unpopular 
litigants). Note that although some scholars have described the federal appellate justice triage system 
as having two “tracks,” I prefer to use the term “tiers,” as it better re.ects the reality that some cases 
receive far more scrutiny, attention, and judicial e#ort than others. 
30 See infra notes %-–%* and accompanying text (discussing third tier of federal appellate 
decisions). Some might conceive of this discovery as providing a greater or deeper understanding 
of the content of the second tier. Because of its relative invisibility and the possibility that it includes 
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all but court insiders and the parties themselves—an access and use limitation 
that rule changes and technological shifts sought to ameliorate long ago. 
For scholars concerned with access to justice, this discovery calls into 
question our ability to assess how the federal appellate courts administer 
justice. If only three-quarters of the work of the federal appellate courts has 
ever been truly visible to us, how can we assess the quality of process and the 
even-handedness of treatment that these courts have provided? 
More problematic, still, is that what’s missing from commercial databases 
appears to include disproportionately appeals from the most vulnerable 
litigants—including pro se litigants, criminal appellants, and noncitizens. 
Although the litigants themselves receive the decisions that the rest of us 
cannot ,nd, the selective issuance scheme may change the shape and scope of 
available law. As the Jones case itself highlights,31 some missing decisions may 
inform the contours of the duties imposed on defendant state actors—and yet 
bench, bar, and the actors themselves do not have ready access to those 
decisions for use in future cases. Missing decisions, therefore, may skew the 
law itself, depriving litigants of useful precedent and potentially shaping the 
contours of a state actor’s constitutional duties. Not all missing decisions are 
as consequential as the tableau that begins this piece. But at least some are. 
For practitioners and other legal researchers, this Article reveals that we’ve 
been lulled into a false sense of transparency and access to precedent by rule 
changes and legislation that seemingly ensured navigable access and the free use 
of unpublished decisions across the federal appellate courts. We have mistaken 
the federal system’s lofty commitment to access with the reality on the ground. 
The implications of this work extend well beyond the halls of academia. I 
call here on the courts to address this problem, and, in doing so, question the 
structure and transparency of basic court processes themselves. Courts have 
devolved decisions about access to individual judges or panels—or, perhaps, 
individual court clerks—who triage decisions and, in the process, e-ectively 
limit access to those decisions deemed less consequential. The screening may 
occur without any awareness of its consequences—that is, without any 
awareness that the commercial databases generally do not pay for access to 
the less formal types of appellate decisions used to resolve some appeals. But 
this Article exposes those consequences and, in so doing, calls for the courts 
to change their processes to ensure complete and free access to all ,nal, judge-
issued decisions of the federal appellate courts. 
This Article begins at the end: Part I explains just how wrong our 
assumptions about access to unpublished federal appellate decisions have 
 
decisions of the worst quality in some circuits, I argue here that it represents a class of decisions 
deserving its own examination and its own treatment as a third tier. 
31 See supra notes !–' and accompanying text (discussing Jones). 
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been. Part II works through the details of this discovery, providing a deeper 
understanding of what appears to be missing from commercial databases by 
examining a sample of missing decisions from one circuit. Part III grapples 
with the implications of this discovery, including what this work means for 
our ability to navigate useful precedent and scrutinize the work of the federal 
appellate system. Part IV o-ers the ,x: the federal appellate courts must 
transform their processes to make every ,nal judge-issued decision available 
on a free and publicly accessible website. 
I. ACCESS TO UNPUBLISHED FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS 
This Part tells the story of what we thought we knew and what we now know 
about our ability to navigate unpublished federal appellate decisions. That story 
begins with an explanation of what unpublished decisions we—scholars, 
practicing lawyers, the public, and the commercial databases—thought were 
navigable and easily retrievable before now.32 Then, to borrow from McCuskey’s 
concept of “submerged [district court] precedent,”33 this Part describes what we 
now know: there’s a whole lot of submerged appellate precedent, too.34 
 
32 By email or telephone or both, I had conversations with each of the three major commercial 
databases discussed here. None of their representatives indicated any awareness of signi+cant 
coverage gaps in access to unpublished federal appellate decisions; Westlaw and Lexis, in particular, 
indicated they had complete coverage. See E-mail from Sue Moore, Acad. Acct. Manager, Thomson 
Reuters, to author (Sept. -, $"!%, (:&( AM) (on +le with author) (relaying information from Amanda 
Kenny, Prod. Dev., Thomson Reuters) (“[B]eginning in $""', there were approximately )"" non-
precedential decisions that were unavailable to Westlaw. The majority of those opinions consisted 
of tables without text sent by the !!th Circuit. . . . $"!$ was the last year that Westlaw received tables 
without text from the !!th Circuit, which was the last court to cease sending such tables. As of $"!), 
non-precedential decisions became available from all circuits.”); E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, Prac. 
Area Consultant, LexisNexis Legal & Pro., to Patricia Morgan, Professor of Legal Rsch., Univ. of 
Fla. Levin Coll. of L. (Oct. $!, $"!%, !:$% PM) (relaying information from Emma Dickinson, Prod. 
Manager) (on +le with author) (“You should expect to +nd all US Courts of Appeals opinions online, 
including published and unpublished opinions. If we do miss a case, we are always happy to add it 
to our database.”); E-mail from Ti#any Lozano, Customer Experience Manager, Bloomberg L., to 
author (Aug. !&, $"!%, !!:"' AM) (on +le with author) (Bloomberg Law has “a more expansive 
collection of unpublished decisions within the last !"-!& years.”). 
33 McCuskey, supra note !', at &!'. 
34 Throughout this Article, I invoke the concept of “precedent” broadly and inclusively. Because 
decisions not designated for publication are not binding on other parties and lower courts, they are 
usually described as “nonprecedential.” For reasons discussed later, see infra note )(, I think that label a 
bit of a misnomer, especially in this context. Although unpublished decisions are neither vertical 
precedent nor subject to the prior-panel rule, they are still doctrinally precedential. See McCuskey, 
supra note !', at &!% (using the term “precedent” to refer to “any written decision supported by reasoned 
elaboration” and arguing that “[r]easoned elaboration long has been considered precedent’s defining 
feature, and supplies a decision’s potential utility in deciding future cases”). But see Kagan et al., supra 
note !*, at '%" (stating that McCuskey uses term “precedent more loosely” than other scholars). 
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A. What We Thought We Knew 
Although the distinction between “published” and “unpublished” decisions 
is of relatively recent origin, for a decade or more we generally have thought we 
had full access to both types of decisions at the federal appellate level.35 Freedom 
of access—and the ubiquity of “unpublished” decisions in essentially “published” 
form—had rendered the idea of “unpublished” decisions a “misnomer” to 
some.36 This Section will explain how we came to our historical—and now 
inaccurate—understanding of access to unpublished decisions. 
Before World War II, final decisions in appeals as of right to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals were almost all published in the West Federal Reporter.37 The 
category of “unpublished decisions”38 as we know it now didn’t exist until the 
mid-twentieth century. That is not to say that every federal appellate decision 
always has been published “in the sense of being printed in a book.”39 Indeed, 
as one federal appellate court has explained, “there was almost no private 
reporting and no official reporting at all in the American states” at the time of 
 
35 The assumption of access likely dates back to circa $""!, when West developed the Federal Appendix, 
a reporter which “publishes” unpublished decisions. By then, courts themselves recognized that unpublished 
decisions were widely available to lawyers through electronic means. As the Fifth Circuit put it: 
[W]hen this court promulgated rule -*.& [related to citation of unpublished decisions] 
in !%%&, the relative unavailability of unpublished opinions rendered their use as 
precedent fundamentally unfair. Today, however, that proposition is untenable: 
“Between Lexis and Westlaw, Internet sites maintained by universities and some of 
the circuit courts of appeals, and networks of attorneys practicing in particular +elds, 
it is the rare opinion that is not disseminated for mass consumption.” 
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, $&' F.)d $'", $'! (&th Cir. $""!) (quoting Boggs & Brooks, 
supra note $$, at !(). 
36 See, e.g., David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, &( DUKE L.J. !*%!, !("!-"$ ($""%) 
(describing the “unpublished” moniker as a “misnomer”). 
37 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $", at !"-!' (discussing development of limited 
publication plans across the circuits). 
38 The publication designation identifies inclusion in the official West Federal Reporter. 
Publication is significant only because it distinguishes between “precedential” and “nonprecedential” 
decisions; only those decisions included in the Federal Reporter are binding precedent. See Scott E. 
Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure "#.$, 
-* B.C. L. REV. *"&, *"( ($""'). Some scholars prefer the label “nonprecedential” instead of 
“unpublished” for this reason and because “unpublished” decisions are thought to be widely available 
and usually “published” in less official forms. See, e.g., Beske, supra note $", at (!" n.$. I, however, will 
stick with the term “unpublished” for three reasons. First, it is the term of art used by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
Second, I take a broader view of the meaning of the word “precedent,” and many unpublished 
decisions are decidedly precedential for reasons I explain in Part III; hence, I’m uncomfortable 
describing these decisions as “nonprecedential.” See infra notes !*)–!*% and accompanying text. 
Finally, as it turns out, a lot of “unpublished” decisions truly are “unpublished” in a meaningful sense. 
39 Anasaso# v. United States, $$) F.)d (%(, %") ((th Cir. $"""), vacated as moot, $)& F.)d !"&-, 
!"&' ((th Cir. $""") (en banc). 
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our Founding.40 Further, our understanding of precedent was very different in 
the eighteenth century than it is today, and reliance on judicial opinions 
themselves is a relatively recent invention.41 Publication and precedential status 
generally were not linked until the creation of the categorically nonprecedential 
unpublished decision in the mid-twentieth century.42 
As has been detailed before,43 publication practices began shifting rapidly 
during the !%*"s and !%&"s to address a caseload explosion spurred in part by 
the expansion of federal civil rights and criminal laws.44 Overburdened 
appellate courts used unpublished decisions—decisions that courts decide in 
advance are not binding—to save judicial time.45 If unpublished decisions 
make no law, as the courts decreed, then judges need not say much to explain 
themselves.46 Judges thought that relieving themselves of any elaborate 
reason-giving expectation in easy cases would free up judicial time for hard 
cases. To ensure time-saving, not only did courts restrict the precedential value 
 
40 Id. 
41 See Hart v. Massanari, $'' F.)d !!&&, !!'&-'' (%th Cir. $""!) (“For centuries, the most 
important sources of law were not judicial opinions themselves, but treatises that restated the law, 
such as the commentaries of Coke and Blackstone. Because published opinions were relatively few, 
lawyers and judges relied on commentators’ synthesis of decisions rather than the verbatim text of 
opinions.”); id. at !!'( (“The modern concept of binding precedent—where a single opinion sets the 
course on a particular point of law and must be followed by courts at the same level and lower within 
a pyramidal judicial hierarchy—came about only gradually over the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Lawyers began to believe that judges made, not found, the law.”). 
42 See Anasaso!, $$) F.)d at %") (“Although they lamented the problems associated with the 
lack of a reporting system and worked to assure more systematic reporting, judges and lawyers of 
the day recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even when they were established only by 
memory or by a lawyer’s unpublished memorandum.”). 
43 See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, !!( MICH. L. REV. &)), &-$--( ($"$") (discussing the history of unpublished decisions); 
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $", at )-( (discussing appellate courts’ caseload explosion); id. at !"-
$! (recounting the development of limited publication schemes to combat caseload crisis). 
44 See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, ) J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS !%%, $"- ($""!) (demonstrating that by !%(&, the courts of 
appeals were only publishing -".'% of their merits decisions). 
45 For an early examination of the di,culty of projecting into the future the anticipated 
precedential value of court decisions, see generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, 
The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts 
of Appeals, *( COLUM. L. REV. !!'* (!%*(). 
46 “Reasoned elaboration” is the cornerstone of legal process and the creation of precedent. 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW !-)-&$ (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
!%%-); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An 
Essay for Lon Fuller, %$ HARV. L. REV. -!", -!$ (!%*() (“Explanation is normally a condition to 
performance of the rulemaking function, since rules ordinarily cannot emerge from an outcome 
unless the reasons for that outcome are given.”). 
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of these decisions by deciding not to publish them, but many courts—indeed, 
the majority—also prohibited their citation back to the issuing court.47 
Unsurprisingly, this time-saving scheme raised a host of serious concerns—
many of which William Reynolds and William Richman chronicled in their 
three decades’ worth of work on unpublished decisions.48 In response to that 
onslaught of criticism, beginning in !%%" and lasting into the mid-#"""s, the 
Judicial Conference of the United States49 began exploring a uniform response 
to the use of unpublished decisions across the circuits.50 The courts were 
overrun with unpublished decisions,51 yet until #""$ there were no uniform 
procedures governing their issuance, use, or precedential effect.52 
 
47 Reynolds & Richman, supra note -&, at !!*)-(! (discussing so-called “no-citation” rules); 
Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm and Drang over the Citation of 
Unpublished Opinions, '$ WASH. & LEE L. REV. !-$%, !-)"-)! ($""&) (explaining that, before Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure )$.!, ten of the thirteen circuit courts either forbade citation to 
unpublished decisions or discouraged their use). 
48 See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $" (summarizing their work on unpublished 
decisions in federal appellate courts). The literature raising objections to no-citation rules is significant 
and varied; it is also beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Charles L. Babcock, No-Citation Rules: 
An Unconstitutional Prior Restraint, )" LITIG. )) ($""-) (criticizing no-citation rules as “bear[ing] all the 
indicia of a prior restraint”); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of No-Citation Rules, 
) J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS $(* ($""!) (suggesting that no-citation rules may interfere with First 
Amendment rights of speech and petition); Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power, 
and the Constitutionality of ‘No-Citation’ Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, &- STAN. L. REV. !")* ($""$) 
(criticizing the excess discretion awarded to judges to choose not to publish a decision); David S. 
Caudill, Parades of Horribles, Circles of Hell: Ethical Dimensions of the Publication Controversy, '$ WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. !'&) ($""&) (discussing several concerns related to no-citation rules described as a 
“parade of horribles”); see also Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, -- 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. *$), *&% ($""() (“With the availability of unpublished opinions, the original 
reasons for no-citation rules no longer justify their continued existence.”); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, 
Legal Fiction of the “Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of 
Candor, ! SETON HALL CIR. REV. $*, %$ ($""&) (“The conflicting local rules of the federal circuits 
regarding the citation of unpublished decisions raise puzzling questions about whether federal courts 
of appeals have a right to prevent attorneys and litigants from referencing opinions that the courts have 
no practical ability to keep out of the public eye.”). 
49 The Judicial Conference frames policy guidelines for administration of the federal courts. $% 
U.S.C. § ))!. As the reporter for the Advisory Committee recounts in exceptional detail, the Judicial 
Conference initially refused to consider rulemaking in this area—but the issue kept coming up, again 
and again. See Schiltz, supra note -*, at !-)'-&( (noting persistent opposition to rule-making efforts). 
50 These efforts took so long, in part, because the federal appellate bench opposed uniform 
rulemaking on unpublished decisions; it routinely objected to efforts to consider predecessor versions of 
Rule )$.!, which ultimately was approved in $""'—more than fifteen years after the study began. See 
Schiltz, supra note -*, at !-)$-&( (discussing history of rule-making efforts related to unpublished decisions 
and describing “highly emotional support and opposition” to reform efforts over sixteen-year period). 
51 The rate of unpublished cases in $""" was already almost eighty percent. ADMIN. OFF. OF 
THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.S-) ($"""). Today, that rate has risen 
to nearly ninety percent. $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
52 Even now, the only court-wide rule on unpublished decisions, Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure )$.!, is meager. Regulation of unpublished decisions has devolved to the circuits 
themselves, and the practice is subject to signi+cant circuit-level variation due, perhaps, to circuit-
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Technological innovations—or so we thought—gave the courts a reason 
to reconsider restrictions on the use of unpublished decisions; electronic 
access and even publication of unpublished decisions had rendered the 
moniker “unpublished” a bad ,t by the early #"""s.53 Before federal 
“unpublished” decisions became widely available, some argued it was unfair 
to permit parties to cite them because not every litigant had equal access to 
these decisions.54 But in September #""!, West began printing the Federal 
Appendix, a publication devoted unironically to “unpublished” decisions from 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.55 Unpublished decisions were also made widely 
available by that time through West’s on-line commercial database, Westlaw.56 
Equally important, it was thought that any lingering “access” challenges to 
federal unpublished decisions would soon be overcome.57 “[A]s of December 
 
speci+c customs and culture. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and 
Case Management in the Circuit Courts, '! DUKE L.J. )!&, )'(-*) ($"!!) (examining circuits’ di#erent 
case-management priorities and how those priorities may a#ect court processes). 
53 Goering, supra note -(, at )- n.$-; see also Levi, supra note )', at !("!-"$ (noting that while 
“[b]efore electronic publishing, an unpublished opinion was truly unpublished,” the term had 
become “a misnomer given that all opinions are now published and available electronically”); Patrick 
J. Schiltz, Comments, in Edward R. Becker, et al., The Appellate Judges Speak, *- FORDHAM L. REV. 
!, - ($""&) (“Of course, the phrase ‘unpublished opinions’ is a misnomer, especially now with the 
Federal Appendix, because these opinions are published, not only in the Federal Appendix but in 
numerous other sources . . . .”). 
Even as early as !%%", the Federal Courts Study Committee—a committee convened by 
Congress to study the courts—observed that “inexpensive database access and computerized search 
technologies may justify revisiting the issue [of the no-citation bans], because these developments 
may now or soon will provide wide and inexpensive access to all opinions.” FED. CTS. STUDY 
COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE !)"-)! (!%%"), 
https://www./c.gov/sites/default/+les/$"!$/RepFCSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/-GN*-RCPN]. 
54 See FED. JUD. CTR., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT !( (Apr. !-, $""&), http://www.nonpublication.com/
fjcprelim.pdf [https://perma.cc/C(F&-KXMS] (“A strong historical reason for restricting citation to 
unpublished opinions was the fact that many attorneys did not have easy access to them. But now that 
so many unpublished opinions are available electronically, this reason appears to have less force.”). 
55 See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastaso# to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground 
Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, - J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS !, $ ($""$) (discussing creation of West’s 
Federal Appendix as a “startling action that drains the meaning from the term ‘unpublished’ opinion”). 
56 Lexis and Westlaw both had made unpublished decisions available in their courts of appeals 
databases “for a number of years” before the Federal Appendix arrived. Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s 
Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, %' LAW LIBR. J. -*&, -*& ($""-) (“Westlaw and LexisNexis have, for 
a number of years, included unpublished opinions in their federal courts of appeals databases, and attorneys 
and other researchers have thus had much greater access to the text of these decisions than in the past.”). 
57 There were some anomalous access issues at the time. For example, the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits were late to make their unpublished decisions available to the electronic databases. See 
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Int. & Intell. Prop. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, !"*th Cong. -$, -' ($""$) [hereinafter Hellman Statement] (statement of 
Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law) (discussing 
electronic access issues for unpublished decisions). And the Third Circuit, curiously, made available 
on its website unpublished decisions in counseled cases only. Id. at -' n.&. Whether any circuits 
continue that practice today is unclear—it is not an issue disclosed in local rules—but it could 
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!*, #""',” one scholar wrote at the time, “every federal circuit will be required 
to provide the public internet access to all its written opinions, whether 
designated for ‘publication’ or not.”58 
The reason for the optimism? A little-known law called the E-Government Act 
of #""#.59 That promising legislation obligated each federal court, by December 
#""', to maintain its own website with “[a]ccess [through that website] to the 
substance of all written opinions . . . in a text-searchable format”—“regardless of 
whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter.”60 Scholars 
were hopeful that the E-Government Act would resolve any lingering access issues 
wrought by the move to electronic distribution of court decisions.61 
After extensive study and negotiation, in #""$ the Advisory Committee 
ultimately recommended—and approved—a rule lifting the restrictions on citation 
to federal unpublished decisions that were still in effect in some circuits.62 Under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (#.!, no circuit may restrict the citation of any 
“federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have 
been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not 
precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January !, #""*.”63 
As the advisory committee itself acknowledged, Rule (#.! is “extremely 
limited” in e-ect; it did nothing to alter the status quo other than to lift all 
restrictions on the citation to federal unpublished decisions in federal 
 
account for a signi+cant portion of “missing decisions.” The First Circuit dataset discussed below, 
however, suggests that at least in that circuit such an assumption would be both overinclusive and 
underinclusive. 
58 See Goering, supra note -(, at )- n.$- (observing that “as of December !*, $""- . . . every 
federal circuit will be required to provide the public internet access to all its written opinions, 
whether designated for ‘publication’ or not”). 
59 E-Government Act of $""$, Pub. L. !"*–)-*, !!' Stat. $(%% (codi+ed as amended in 
scattered sections of -- U.S.C.). 
60 Id. § $"&(a)(&), !!' Stat. at $%!) (codi+ed at -- U.S.C. § )&"! note). Speci+cally, the statute 
requires that 
[t]he Chief Justice of the United States, the chief judge of each circuit and district and 
of the Court of Federal Claims, and the chief bankruptcy judge of each district shall 
cause to be established and maintained, for the court of which the judge is chief justice 
or judge, a website that contains the following information or links to websites with 
the following information: . . . Access to the substance of all written opinions issued 
by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the o,cial 
court reporter, in a text searchable format. 
§ $"&(a) (codi+ed at -- U.S.C. § )&"! note). 
61 See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note &-, at !( (“Twelve attorneys mentioned how accessible 
unpublished opinions are now, but !- attorneys said that unpublished opinions are still often less 
accessible than published opinions.”); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall 
for Defendants, )- HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. %%, !"& (!%%%) (recognizing that approximately one-third 
of affirmances in employment discrimination cases were not available on commercial databases in part 
because certain circuits “do not make their unpublished opinions available to any electronic source”). 
62 FED. R. APP. P. )$.! advisory committee notes ($""' amendments). 
63 FED. R. APP. P. )$.!(a). 
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appellate courts.64 Whether by rule or court decision, unpublished decisions 
continue to be nonbinding in every circuit.65 But they are usable—and have 
been for over a decade—despite their limited precedential value. 
Today, unpublished decisions dominate the output of the federal appellate 
courts. Only approximately twelve percent of the merits terminations of the 
courts of appeals end in published decisions that bind lower courts and future 
litigants.66 Until now, though, we thought we had access to unpublished 
decisions in equal measure, thereby making the distinction between the 
categories one of precedential e-ect, not of access. We were wrong. 
B. What We Now Know 
Neither technology nor the E-Government Act has ensured uniform, 
navigable access to all federal appellate decisions (regardless of whether they 
are published or not). A sizable portion of the work of the federal courts of 
appeals remains locked away behind PACER’s di+cult-to-use paywall.67 
These decisions are not ,ndable on the appellate courts’ free and public 
websites; they, in turn, are not picked up by Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg 
Law; and, to make matters worse, courts only sporadically share decisions 
 
64 See FED. R. APP. P. )$.! advisory committee notes ($""' amendments) (“[Rule )$.!] does 
not require any court to issue an unpublished opinion or forbid any court from doing so. . . . It says 
nothing about what e#ect a court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the unpublished 
opinions of another court.”). 
65 In every circuit, decisions that are not designated for publication are not binding precedent. 
United States v. Sanford, -*' F.)d )%!, )%' ('th Cir. $""*); Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., -'( 
F.)d $!), $!% (-th Cir. $""'); !ST CIR. R. )$.!."; $D CIR. R. )$.!.!; )D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROC. &.!, &.$, &.); &TH CIR. R. -*.&.-; *TH CIR. R. )$.!(b); (TH CIR. R. )$.!A; %TH CIR. R. )'-
)(a); !"TH CIR. R. )$.!(A); D.C. CIR. R. )'(e)($); !!TH CIR. R. )'; !!TH CIR. INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROC. '. 
66 $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-!$. 
67 Unless sealed or otherwise protected from disclosure, all documents filed with the courts, 
including court orders and opinions, are publicly available on PACER. Frequently Asked Questions: 
What Information is Available Through PACER, PACER, https://pacer.uscourts.gov/help/faqs/what-
information-available-through-pacer [https://perma.cc/'RAZ-PCKE]. But the problems with 
PACER are legion. PACER is a difficult, and expensive, system to use. Its fees can be high and 
frustrate the goals of public access. See Mackenzie Arthur, Invisible Shackles: The Monopolization of 
Public Access Legal Research Due to Government Failures, !% HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. !$), !-" ($"!%) 
(“Although case opinions are free, a !"-cent per page fee is imposed by the system for other documents 
like pleadings and motions. As such, one can accumulate charges without knowing whether the 
document is relevant.”); see also Stephen J. Schultze, The Price of Ignorance: The Constitutional Cost of 
Fees for Access to Electronic Public Court Records, !"' GEO. L.J. !!%*, !$!) ($"!() (“PACER provides no 
meaningful mechanism for nonparties to receive notice of new activity on a given case, and it is often 
impossible to determine in advance how much the results of a search will cost.”). 
PACER also lacks a keyword-search function, indexing, and a multi-jurisdictional search tool 
for +led documents. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clari%cation: Grable Federal Questions in 
the Eyes of Their Beholders, %! NEB. L. REV. )(*, --) ($"!$) (“[S]earching PACER for legal issues, as 
opposed to case-identifying information, is lugubrious.”). 
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with FDsys, the only free, consolidated, government-run legal research tool 
for federal court opinions.68 
All four resources—Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg Law, and FDsys—depend 
on the courts themselves for access to judicial decisions. Historically, the 
courts sent opinions directly to the databases.69 Now, the databases depend on 
public sources—court websites and PACER, primarily—to retrieve federal 
court opinions.70 FDsys, on the other hand, receives opinions through a bridge 
with the federal courts’ CM/ECF docketing system.71 For the decision to be 
received, someone on the court’s side must indicate that the decisions should 
 
68 The rudimentary PACER system is not the only government-run electronic research tool for legal 
research. The U.S. Government Printing Office (“GPO”) also runs a database of government documents, 
known as the Federal Digital System or “FDsys,” that includes federal court opinions. Amy Pearce, 
Goodbye, GPO Access, Hello, FDsys, WYO. LAW., June $"!$, at )-, )-. FDsys is available at www.govinfo.gov. 
In $"!), the Judicial Conference approved a pilot project to send court opinions directly to the GPO for 
inclusion in FDsys. Press Release, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Access to Court Opinions Expands 
[hereinafter Access Expands], Jan. )!, $"!), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/$"!)/"!/)!/access-court-
opinions-expands [https://perma.cc/-HR*-ZPA$]. 
Unlike PACER, opinions on FDsys “are text-searchable across opinions and courts.” Id. Indeed, 
the Administrative O,ce lauded the FDsys project as one that would “allow[] the Judiciary to make 
its work more easily available to the public.” Id. Within a year, FDsys court participants grew to 
sixty-four, and the Administrative O,ce claimed that more than *&",""" opinions were available on 
FDsys dating back to $""-. Press Release, Admin. O#. of the U.S. Cts., '- Federal Courts Now 
Publish Opinions on FDsys, Nov. !), $"!), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/$"!)/!!/!)/'--federal-
courts-now-publish-opinions-fdsys [https://perma.cc/N&FT-D*L&]. Even before that expansion, 
according to the Administrative O,ce, federal court opinions were “already one of the most heavily 
used collections on FDsys, with millions of retrievals each month.” Access Expands, supra. 
In $"!', FDsys migrated to “govinfo,” “a new, upgraded platform for accessing federal government 
information,” that “replicates the functionality and content on FDsys.” Erik Beck, Introducing Govinfo: 
A New Source for Federal Government Documents Online, COL. LAW., Feb. $"!*, at *), *). The improved 
platform continues to have coverage gaps, as not all courts have opted into posting opinions on the 
GPO system. The appellate courts have opted into coverage, but coverage remains spotty year over 
year, as I will discuss in Part II and show in the Appendix. See also Martin, supra note !', at )!&-!' 
(describing coverage of FDsys as including “all twelve regional circuit courts of appeals”). 
69 E-mail from Sue Moore, Academic Account Manager, Thomson Reuters, to Merritt E. 
McAlister, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law (Aug. ', $"!%, 
!":!' AM) (“Historically, the federal courts of appeals sent or e-mailed decisions to Westlaw for 
inclusion in our content.”) (relaying information from Amanda Kenny, Product Developer, 
Thomson Reuters) (on +le with author). 
70 Id. (“Today, however, Westlaw proactively acquires the documents through PACER or court 
websites. By obtaining decisions directly from PACER or the court websites, Westlaw is able to 
obtain decisions it would not otherwise have had, as well as individual court orders requested by 
customers.”) (relaying information from Amanda Kenny, Product Developer, Thomson Reuters) (on 
+le with author); E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note )$ (“For federal courts, we generally collect 
opinions from the court websites or PACER.”); E-mail from Ti#any Lozano, supra note )$ (similar). 
71 According to an Administrative Office press release, the GPO system can “pull[] opinions 
nightly from courts’ Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) systems and send[] them to 
the GPO, where they are processed and posted on the FDsys website.” Access Expands, supra note '(. 
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be shared, which requires a CM/ECF user to indicate the decision is a “written 
opinion” within the meaning of the E-Government Act.72 
What the databases ultimately recover from court websites is a lot less than 
what the courts produce—at least, it is a lot less than what the courts say they 
produce. Comparing the courts’ self-reported number of “merits 
terminations” with the number of database hits during the same corresponding 
time period reveals a nontrivial shortfall.73 That shortfall is consistent across 
the major commercial databases, but it varies among the circuits—suggesting 
that the courts, and not the databases, have disparate practices. 
A word about terminology before I proceed further. “Merits terminations” 
is a term-of-art used, but not entirely defined, by the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts in its statistical reporting.74 Although the Administrative 
Office does not define “merits,” “merits” terminations are opposed to 
“procedural” ones, which are separately reported.75 “Terminations” count the 
“Last Opinion or Final Order,” whether reasoned or not, whether signed by a 
judge or not, and whether written or not.76 
“Merits terminations” occur in what we might traditionally think of as 
“appeals as of right,” as well as proceedings that originate in the appellate 
courts themselves, which I discuss below. Appeals as of right are decisions 
over which the U.S. Courts of Appeals have mandatory appellate jurisdiction, 
including ,nal judgments from the district courts;77 certain orders that are 
su+ciently ,nal for purposes of appeal;78 interlocutory orders granting or 
denying injunctive relief;79 and appeals from certain administrative agency 
decisions.80 Throughout this Article, I will use the term “appeals as of right” 
to identify traditional appellate decisions that a+rm, vacate, remand, or 
reverse district court decisions (or enforce or vacate agency action). 
Not all proceedings in the federal appellate courts involve appeals as of right; 
discretionary relief is sought in a variety of circumstances, including requests 
for permission to appeal and requests for extraordinary relief. The U.S. Courts 
of Appeals have discretionary jurisdiction over some nonfinal orders,81 writs,82 
 
72 Martin, supra note !', at )$". 
73 See infra Section II.A (describing data collection e#orts). 
74 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
75 Id. tbl.B-&A. 
76 Id. tbl.B-!$. 
77 $( U.S.C. § !$%!. 
78 Cohen v. Bene+cial Indus. Loan Corp., ))* U.S. &-!, &-&--* (!%-%). 
79 § !$%$(a). 
80 § !$%'. 
81 § !$%$(b). 
82 § !'&!(a). 
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and many habeas corpus proceedings.83 Throughout this Article, I will use the 
umbrella term “original proceedings” as a shorthand to refer to discretionary 
proceedings not involving mandatory-jurisdiction appeals as of right. 
All told, of these “merits terminations” from appeals as of right and original 
proceedings, nearly thirty percent remain out of easy reach.84 These decisions are 
essentially only usable if we know they exist already and can use certain case 
information—for example, a case name or number—to locate the decision on 
PACER. These decisions would not be locatable using traditional keyword 
searching, because PACER does not offer that feature.85 PACER’s limitations 
therefore render the missing decisions largely useless to all but the judges and court 
staff that worked on a particular case and the parties that received the decision. 
That kind of limited access is a problem that technology and the E-Government 
Act were thought to have solved more than a decade ago. They didn’t. 
But this is only two-thirds of the story. Merits terminations—which are the 
focus of this Article—account for only approximately two-thirds of all 
appellate-level dispositions in the federal courts. Approximately one-third of 
all appeals are resolved through procedural dismissals.86 The vast majority of 
procedural terminations are in a “black box.”87 Courts generally do not make 
procedural terminations available as easily and freely as merits terminations. 
That choice may make a good deal of sense for dismissals based on failure to 
prosecute an appeal, but it makes less sense when the dismissal is for 
jurisdictional reasons. We know far less about procedural terminations, 
including how many result in published decisions. The First Circuit dataset 
discussed in Part II suggests that we nevertheless have access to at least some 
procedural terminations on commercial databases (approximately eleven 
percent of the procedural terminations issued during the study period were 
available).88 Some of these available procedural decisions are reasoned; others 
 
83 See § $$-! (authorizing circuit judge to entertain an original application for a writ of habeas 
corpus); § $$&)(c) (requiring habeas corpus petitioner to seek certi+cate of appealability to appeal 
adverse decision); § $$--(b)()) (requiring courts of appeals to authorize second or successive habeas 
corpus applications under § $$&- and § $$&&). 
84 See infra Section II.B. 
85 See McCuskey, supra note '*, at --) (“PACER, by contrast, is comprehensive but not yet 
text-searchable, multi-jurisdictional, or indexed as +nitely—so searching PACER for legal issues, as 
opposed to case-identifying information, is lugubrious.”). 
86 Compare $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-& (merits terminations), with id. 
tbl.B-&A (procedural terminations). 
87 Kagan et al., supra note !*, at '((; see also David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: 
Re&ections on the Debate over Unpublished Decisions, '$ WASH. & LEE L. REV. !''*, !'*" ($""&) (using 
the same language to describe this “largely invisible and poorly understood” process). 
88 See infra Table * (summarizing the First Circuit dataset). 
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are, inexplicably, the kinds of procedural terminations that we might not expect 
to find (for example, voluntary dismissals by the appellant or both parties).89 
In their recent work, Kagan, Gill, and Marouf divvied up the world of 
federal appellate output into four categories, based on relative usable access 
to that output: (!) “[p]recedent decisions”; (#) “[n]onprecedent, visible 
decisions”; (() “[n]onprecedent, invisible decisions”; and (') “[n]onmerits 
decisions (invisible).”90 Although I agree with their focus on the relative 
visibility of the courts’ work, I take issue with their use of “precedent” because 
even unpublished decisions can be understood broadly as “precedent.” Even 
though “unpublished” decisions are not binding, these decisions nevertheless 
implicate the core reasons for why a “decisionmaking mechanism [might] 
incorporate substantial precedential constraints”: concerns for judicial 
decisionmaking fairness, e+ciency, and predictability.91 
I suggest, instead, that we focus on three tiers of federal appellate work: 
(!) visible/accessible binding decisions; (#) visible/accessible nonbinding 
decisions; and (() invisible/inaccessible nonbinding decisions. “Decisions” is 
a broad term that captures more formal opinions, as well as less formal 
judgments and orders; “decisions” includes any “,nal order or opinion,” which 
the Administrative O+ce reports as terminations.92 Some of these decisions 
will be procedural and some will be on the merits. “Binding” refers to a 
decision that (by virtue of the publication signal) will have a binding e-ect 
on future cases and on lower courts. “Nonbinding” decisions, then, are 
decisions that the appellate panel does not agree to follow in future cases; 
these are decisions that a-ect only the parties themselves, though they may 
be used by others persuasively. The visibility status describes decisions that 
are available on court websites and in commercial databases. 
This classi,cation scheme redirects our attention to what are the de,ning 
attributes of federal appellate decisions: their visibility/accessibility and their 
binding/nonbinding e-ect. In resolving the appeals before them, the federal 
courts appear to tailor their output along both of these dimensions. Not all 
decisions will bind others, and not all decisions will be as easily accessible and 
visible to the public as the decisions that do bind. My classi,cation focuses 
on the core features of the appellate courts’ decisional classi,cation and 
 
89 See, e.g., SimpliVity Corp. v. Bondranko, No. !'-$!'%, $"!' WL %''&&--, at *! (!st Cir. Oct. 
', $"!') (“Upon consideration of appellant’s unopposed motion, it is hereby ordered that this appeal 
be voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. -$(b).”). 
90 Kagan et al., supra note !*, at '(%; see also Vladeck & Gulati, supra note (*, at !'*" n.( (using 
similar taxonomy). 
91 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, )% STAN. L. REV. &*!, &%&-%% (!%(*) (discussing core values 
of a precedential system); see also McCuskey, supra note !', at &&!-&$ (arguing that district court 
decisions should be broadly understood as precedent, even if not binding on others). 
92 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
#"#!] Missing Decisions !!!% 
issuance scheme: visibility and constraint.93 I am less focused on whether the 
,nal decision is procedural (for example, a dismissal of an appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction) or substantive (for example, an a+rmance of a summary 
judgment decision). Both types of decisions may have value, may be 
accessible or inaccessible, and may constrain or not constrain. 
The scheme as I describe it here also suggests that there may be a third 
tier of appellate justice in the federal system. Richman and Reynolds’ powerful 
work revealed a two-tier appellate justice system in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.94 They describe a first-tier process, whereby the system’s haves 
receive careful judicial scrutiny, oral argument, and reasoned, published 
decisions.95 The system’s have-nots, on the other hand, rarely receive oral 
argument, their decisions are resolved by judicial staff attorneys with little 
oversight, and their appeals end in short, perfunctory unpublished decisions.96 
The unpublished decision itself is a signal of second-tier treatment.97 But the 
original empirical work described in the next Part will reveal there is another 
category, still: decisions thought so unimportant, uninteresting, or 
unremarkable that courts resolve them without formal “opinions,” thereby 
 
93 This classi+cation scheme draws no distinction between procedural terminations and merits 
terminations, as Kagan, Gill, and Marouf ’s does. The reason for failing to do so is two-fold: First, 
and foremost, I will ultimately argue for free and total access to all federal appellate judge-ordered 
terminations; because I want to mitigate the possibility of court screening based on decisional 
issuance schemes, I don’t see much value in drawing a sharp distinction between procedural and 
merits terminations in de+ning the right to our free access (though my reform proposal will draw a 
distinction between judicial and clerk-ordered procedural terminations). Second, the types of orders 
that resolve “merits” terminations and “procedural” terminations are not always that distinct; both 
types of terminations can occur through perfunctory orders or judgments. It appears that the type 
of order, as opposed to the type of termination, may play a more signi+cant role in determining our 
relative access to the termination. Because my classi+cation scheme focuses on access, it seems less 
useful to subdivide the categories further into procedural and merits terminations. 
94 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $", at !!', !!%-$" (describing appellate triage system). 
95 See id. at !!%-$". They provide an example of 
a litigant in an ‘important’ antitrust or securities case, one who is represented by 
serious counsel, [which] will get the full Learned Hand treatment. There will be oral 
argument, an opinion prepared by the judge and her sta#, and the result will contain 
a su,ciently detailed explanation so that the whole world can second-guess the 
result—and have an informed idea as to the state of the law. 
Id. 
96 Id. at !$". And they provide a counterexample: 
A litigant who is poor, without counsel, and with a boring, repetitive problem, on the 
other hand, can expect only the second-hand treatment that is available on Track Two. 
Because Track Two provides so little information to the litigants or to the parties, no 
one can even guess as to the quality of the justice handed out on that track. 
Id. 
97 See McAlister, supra note -), at &'*-'( (explaining the relationship between unpublished 
decisions and the second-tier appellate justice system). 
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locking a class of decisions away behind PACER’s paywall. The “third tier,” 
then, are those decisions beneath unpublished visible decisions, which are the 
mainstay of the second tier. The third tier is a body of appellate decisions that 
are missing from the most widely used legal research tools. 
II. WHAT’S MISSING FROM LEGAL DATABASES 
This Part will explain how our navigable access to unpublished decisions 
is not—and likely never has been—what we thought it was. It will detail the 
extent of what’s missing throughout the circuits and o-er some insight into 
how those decisions escape the reach of commercial databases. It begins by 
describing the process I used to compile the data that prove the existence of 
submerged appellate precedent. Then it analyzes the data for two recent 
Administrative O+ce reporting years (#"!* and #"!&); data for earlier years 
appear in the Appendix. This Part will also consider a dataset of missing 
decisions from the First Circuit to explain how decisions go missing and 
evaluate the content of missing decisions. 
A. The Data-Collection Process 
To determine the extent of what’s missing, I compared publicly available 
data from the Administrative O+ce for the U.S. Courts with database hits 
from each commercial database. This is not exactly an apples-to-apples 
comparison, so let me explain ,rst what the baseline Administrative O+ce 
data include and then I’ll discuss the commercial database search process. 
The Administrative O+ce reports on appellate terminations each year in 
two categories: “merits” terminations and “procedural” terminations.98 
Nearly all of the scholarly work on unpublished decisions focuses on “merits” 
terminations from the U.S. Courts of Appeals.99 That’s because the only data 
the Administrative O+ce makes publicly available on publication status 
concerns “[o]pinion[s] or [o]rder[s]” in cases “[t]erminated on the 
[m]erits,”100 as described in Table B-!# of the annual Judicial Business report.101 
The data discussed here likewise derive from Table B-!#. 
 
98 Compare $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$ (merits terminations), with id. 
tbl.B-&A (procedural terminations). 
99 See, e.g., Kagan et al., supra note !*, at '%' (omitting procedural terminations from authors’ analysis). 
100 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
101 Because the Administrative O,ce reports data on published and unpublished decisions on 
a rolling twelve-month basis ending in September )" of each year, the “year” for each data point 
runs from October ! to September )". E.g., id. 
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Although Table B-!# does not break down “merits” terminations by nature 
of suit,102 it does provide some insight into whether “merits” terminations are 
reasoned or not. The Administrative Office reports on “Signed” and 
“Reasoned, Unsigned” final opinions/orders, and these categories “[i]include[] 
only opinions and orders which expound the law as applied to the facts of the 
case and detail the judicial reasons upon which the judgment is based.”103 
Separately, the Administrative Office reports on “unsigned, without 
comment” merits terminations, which appear to be unreasoned—meaning, 
orders that do not “expound the law as applied to the facts of the case.”104 
For the court-issued terminations baseline—that is, for the number of 
annual appellate terminations each database should have—I used 
postconsolidation105 “merits” terminations numbers from Table B-!# for each 
circuit. These numbers included both published and unpublished 
terminations. I also included in that baseline unreasoned or “without 
comment” decisions. No commercial database reported omitting 
terminations because they issued without reasoning.106 
 
102 Other tables in Judicial Business do, however. Courts report “merits” terminations in eight 
broad categories: “Criminal,” “U.S. Prisoner Petitions,” “Other U.S. Civil,” “Private Prisoner 
Petitions,” “Other Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy,” “Administrative Agency Appeals,” and “Original 
Proceedings and Miscellaneous Applications.” Id. tbl.B-&. Most of these categories are self-
explanatory, but some are not. “Private Prisoner Petitions” includes nonfederal prisoners (e.g., state 
prisoners). Id. “Prisoner Petitions,” more generally, includes both habeas corpus and civil rights 
+lings from prisoners. Id. tbl.B!-A (identifying subcategories of cases within the eight major 
categories). Neither prisoner category includes habeas corpus proceedings +led originally in the 
appellate courts, requests to +le second or successive habeas petitions, or requests for certi+cates of 
appealability—all of which are within the “Original Proceedings and Miscellaneous Applications” 
category (along with other requests to appeal). FED. R. APP. P. $$; !'AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § )%'(, at *$, *&, § )%'(.!, at *', ()-(- (-th ed. $""(). These categories of appeals—
criminal, private prisoner, U.S. prisoner, and original proceedings, speci+cally—comprise 
approximately sixty percent of all appellate proceedings terminated on the merits and 
overwhelmingly involve pro se litigants, which are approximately half of all appellants in the federal 
system. McAlister, supra note -), at &&&, &&& +g.'; $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-&. 
103 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
104 Id. 
105 A word about consolidation on appeal: A certain number of appeals are resolved or 
terminated through consolidation; I used decisional numbers that accounted for and removed 
consolidated decisions. Id. So, if three cases are consolidated into one, that would only count as one 
merits termination. The Administrative O,ce tracks terminations through consolidation for appeals 
resolved both on the merits and on procedural grounds. See id. (listing total terminations and 
terminations through consolidation); id. tbl.B-&A (same). 
106 See E-mail from Sue Moore, Academic Account Manager, Thomson Reuters, to Merritt E. 
McAlister, Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of L. (Aug. !', $"!%, !":!' AM) (relaying information from 
Amanda Kenny, Product Developer, Thomson Reuters) (on +le with author) (“In terms of what 
Westlaw chooses to include in our content, we generally do not include ‘housekeeping’ orders. 
Additionally, correcting orders are incorporated and merged into the original orders, rather than 
published separately. Westlaw does not exercise any discretion in terms of the content of decisions 
or orders.”). A representative at LexisNexis described their policy: 
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I did not, however, include “procedural” terminations in my baseline.107 A 
significant number of appeals as of right and original proceedings terminate on 
procedural grounds. For the twelve-month period ending on September (", #"!&, 
for example, only approximately sixty-two percent of terminations were on the 
merits, while one-third of terminations were on procedural grounds (the 
remaining five percent of terminations were appeals resolved through 
consolidation, which I excluded from all calculations).108 Procedural terminations 
include dismissals for jurisdictional defects, voluntary dismissals under Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure '#, dismissals for defaults, and dismissals resulting 
from procedural defects in the request for a certificate of appealability.109 Either 
a judge (or two or three)110 may issue a procedural termination; other times, the 
clerk’s office can dispose of the appeal on procedural grounds (in the case of 
voluntary dismissals and some kinds of procedural defaults).111 Of the procedural 
terminations during the #"!& reporting period, nearly twenty percent were 
judicial procedural dismissals for jurisdictional reasons, while seventy-five 
percent were dismissals from the clerk’s office (often for want of 
prosecution/default or due to voluntary dismissal under Rule '#).112 The 
following graph breaks down the relative percentage of procedural terminations 
by judges and clerk’s offices during the #"!& reporting period. 
 
The Lexis policy at the appellate level, both federal and state, is to collect all substantive, 
written opinions. Depending on the jurisdiction, our collection guidelines may limit the 
collection of purely procedure orders, e.g., a routine scheduling order. However, the 
length of the document does not determine its substantive value, as a one-word 
affirmance would be highly valuable as part of the overall case history in Shepard’s. 
E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note )$. 
107 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-&A. 
108 Compare id. tbl.B-& (merits terminations), with id. tbl.B-&A (procedural terminations). See 
also supra note !"& (discussing consolidation). 
109 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-&A. A decision to grant or deny a certi+cate 
of appealability on the merits of the request is a “merits” termination. See id. tbl.B-&. 
110 Some procedural terminations result from one-judge orders; others from two-judge orders; 
and still others receive a full panel. See, e.g., !!TH CIR. R. $*-!(d)($) (single judge may rule on 
certi+cates of appealability); id. $*-!(e) (authorizing two-judge panels for speci+ed motions); )D 
CIR. R. $*.& (describing powers of single judge). 
111 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. -$(b); !!TH CIR. R. -$(a), (b) (“The circuit clerk may dismiss a 
docketed appeal if the parties +le a signed dismissal agreement . . . .”); )D CIR. R. $-.$ (discussing 
dismissals for failure to +le). 
112 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-&A. 
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Figure !: Procedural Terminations in "#!$ by Type of Resolution 
The bottom line: the majority of procedural dismissals involve 
administrative, and not judicial, action. To that end, many procedural 
terminations likely issue without much or any reasoning, and therefore we 
might not expect that these decisions would ,nd their way to a commercial 
database. But that is not true of all procedural terminations, of course. Some 
terminations for jurisdictional reasons by the court will have public value—
possibly signi,cant public value. Indeed, some procedural terminations result 
in precedential, published decisions.113 Dismissals by the clerk’s o+ce, on the 
other hand, generally are only descriptive, as clerk’s o+ce terminations only 
occur by agreement of the parties114 or after the appellant fails to prosecute 
the appeal (assuming notice of such dismissal has been given).115 
Because the commercial databases generally do not catalogue 
“housekeeping” orders,116 and because few of those orders are ,ndable 
without using the fee-based PACER system, I therefore did not include 
procedural termination numbers in my baseline comparisons. Even if these 
decisions have public value, the commercial databases generally do not pick 
them up (and the First Circuit dataset suggests that databases pick up only 
about ten percent of procedural terminations).117 What is reasonable to 
expect, and what the commercial databases indicate we should expect, is that 
all postconsolidation “merits terminations” are available on Westlaw, Lexis, 
 
113 See, e.g., Flores v. Barr, %)- F.)d %!", %!( (%th Cir. $"!%) (“We dismiss the appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction.”); Jackson v. Curry, ((( F.)d $&%, $'! (*th Cir. $"!*) (“Lacking jurisdiction, we 
dismiss the appeal.”). 
114 FED. R. APP. P. -$(b). 
115 See, e.g., !!TH CIR. R. -$-!(b) (describing failure-to-prosecute procedures). 
116 See supra note !"' (discussing content decisions of commercial databases). 
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and Bloomberg Law. That is why I used postconsolidation merits termination 
numbers as a baseline for the comparisons discussed below. 
Before I describe how I obtained the commercial database data, I should 
note that there is reason for some concern over the reliability of 
Administrative O+ce data.118 But researchers have suggested that data are 
likely to be “highly reliable” where a variable “is useful to track court 
workload or assign resources.”119 The data I rely on here generally fall into 
those more reliable categories, though transcription errors in that data are 
possible.120 I am doubtful, however, that transcription errors alone account 
for the disparities discussed in the next part (and con,rmed by the close 
examination of missing decisions from the First Circuit).121 
Now, I turn to the commercial database data. To obtain the database 
comparators, I ran searches in Westlaw, Lexis, and BloombergLaw’s opinions 
or cases databases limited to the particular circuit (excluding district court 
cases) for the same corresponding time period as each Administrative O+ce 
table. For Westlaw, I searched the “Circuit Court of Appeals Cases” database 
for each geographic circuit using the following advanced search term to obtain 
data corresponding with the twelve-month period ending on September (", 
#"!*: DA(aft "%-("-#"!$ & bef !"-"!-#"!*). I changed the advanced search 
term to “"%-("-#"!)” and “!"-"!-#"!$,” for the previous twelve-month period 
and the years that followed until the twelve-month period beginning on !"-
"!-#""*. I then recorded the number of hits obtained for that period without 
any additional ,ltering on the search results. 
 
118 According to one author, 
Legal scholars have long been suspicious of the accuracy of the [Administrative O,ce] 
data. [Administrative O,ce] bankruptcy data in particular have been judged ‘error 
ridden’ and ‘utterly inadequate for policy purposes.’ Legal scholars working in other 
+elds have defended the [Administrative O,ce] data as at least serviceable depending 
on the research question and the subtlety of the statistical techniques used. 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, %- CAL. L. REV. 
!&(!, !'&$ ($""'); see also Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The 
Six-Month List and the Unintended Consequences of Judicial Accountability, !"& CORNELL L. REV. )'), 
-!% n.!$* ($"$") (discussing unreliability of Administrative O,ce “outcome” data). 
119 Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative O'ce of the 
U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, *( NOTRE DAME L. REV. !-&&, !-') ($"")). 
120 See Jennifer Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of Bankruptcy Statistics, 
!"! COM. L.J. )"*, )-"--! (!%%') (identifying “carelessness” and transcription errors in Administrative 
Office data for bankruptcy court statistics and concluding that although “bankruptcy clerk transcription 
errors do not significantly lower accuracy rates,” “local data entry practices” do exacerbate error rate in 
“nature of case” data). But see Adam M. Samaha, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Inputs and Outputs 
on Appeal: An Empirical Study of Briefs, Big Law, and Case Complexity, !* J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
&!%, &$%-)" ($"$") (observing that authors’ “[o]wn experience with [Administrative Office] appellate 
data has been positive in the main” and that results of audits “were encouraging”). 
121 See infra Section II.C (discussing First Circuit merits decisions found on PACER but 
unavailable on Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg Law). 
#"#!] Missing Decisions !!#) 
For Lexis, I requested all content for its circuit-speci,c “cases” database 
and then I limited those results using the “timeline” feature in Lexis Advance. 
I used a timeline of !"/!/#"** to "%/("/#"**, depending on the twelve-month 
period at issue. I then recorded the number of hits obtained during that 
twelve-month period without any additional ,ltering on the search results. 
The process for retrieving database hits from Bloomberg Law was similar, 
with one important difference. Bloomberg Law’s opinions database has a !,"""-
hit limit.122 Accordingly, for most circuits, I had to break the date-limited search 
into several months or even one-month time periods (for the Ninth Circuit, in 
particular) to ensure completeness. Otherwise, the process was functionally the 
same: I conducted a search (without any keywords) limited only by a date range 
(!"/!/#"** to "%/("/#"**) for a particular twelve-month period. I then recorded 
the number of hits that each date-limited search returned. 
To gather coverage data for the FDsys database, I conducted an 
“advanced” date-range search for between !"/!/#"** and "%/("/#"** in the 
United States Courts Opinions database for each consecutive twelve-month 
period. Although I limited that search by circuit, it was necessary to ,lter by 
circuit as well, because the database returns hits for both district court and 
circuit decisions within each circuit search. I recorded the number of hits 
returned for each appropriately limited search, which was sometimes “"” 
when the database did not have any data for a particular circuit during a 
particular twelve-month period. 
Finally, a word of caution on reproducing my results: The databases are 
not static. As Westlaw and Lexis both stated, material may be added to a 
database at any time.123 Unsurprisingly, then, rerunning these searches at a 
later point in time revealed slight discrepancies. On occasion, one or two hits 
fewer or more would occur over the relevant time period. The data described 
here are accurate as of September/October #"!%, when I asked a research 
assistant to update the initial results I obtained in June #"!%. 
 
122 Missing decisions may be +ndable if armed with certain case information by doing a docket-
based search on Bloomberg Law. Bloomberg Law operates two databases for federal appellate court 
material: an “opinion database” and a “docket database.” E-mail from Ti#any Lozano, supra note )$. 
The former is similar to Westlaw and Lexis’s “cases” databases. The latter is essentially a more usable 
form of the federal courts’ public electronic records system, known as PACER, and “consists of [a] 
daily collection of newly +led unsealed cases.” Id. Although Bloomberg Law’s docket search system 
is keyword searchable (unlike PACER), its functionality is limited in so far as researchers generally 
may not isolate particular types of docket entries (including orders or opinions) for any circuit court, 
id., resulting in a signi+cant volume of irrelevant search hits. Moreover, the Bloomberg Law docket 
database frequently requires manual updating—even when decisions were issued several years 
earlier. For these reasons, Bloomberg Law’s opinions database may be the tool of choice for many 
researchers, which is why I discuss it (and not the dockets database) here. 
123 E-mail from Sue Moore, supra note !"' (relaying information from Amanda Kenny, Product 
Developer, Thomson Reuters) (describing access to unpublished decisions as “an evolving pool”); E-mail 
from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note )$ (“If we do miss a case, we are always happy to add it to our database.”). 
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B. The Extent of What’s Missing 
Let’s start with the raw numbers. In the twelve-month period ending 
September (", #"!*, the twelve geographic courts of appeals self-reported that 
they issued (',"') merits decisions.124 For the same time period, a search of 
Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law’s circuit-specific opinions databases 
returned #',''$, #',&#$, and #',*!$ total hits, respectively; FDsys returned only 
!*,#%* hits.125 Buried within that discrepancy are a few notable facts. First, the 
discrepancy among the commercial databases is, overall, slight. Second, the size 
of the discrepancy varies by circuit. Table !, below, includes the raw numbers. 
 
Table !: Availability of Merits Terminations 126 
 















D.C. Cir. '&! )&( %"$ )#$ %!* 
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##th Cir. ($!' !%(! ##'* #'#* ##'& 
Total ('"') !*#%* #'*!$ #'''$ #'&#$ 
 
Let me underscore a few points about the limits of these comparisons—
limitations that follow from the discussion of the data-collection process 
above.127 Although the Administrative O+ce numbers in Table ! capture 
 
124 $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-!$. Because the Administrative O,ce does 
not report data on unpublished decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
that circuit’s work is not discussed in this Article. 
125 See supra Section II.A. (describing data collection procedures). 
126 Data from the “AO” is the Administrative O,ce of the U.S. Courts, and is available 
Caseload Statistics Data Tables, supra note (. Data from Bloomberg Law, Westlaw, and Lexis describe 
the number of database hits returned on the searches described above. See supra Section II.A. 
(describing data collection procedures). 
127 See supra notes !"*–!!$ and accompanying text (discussing the decision to exclude 
procedural terminations in comparison). 
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“merits” or nonprocedural ,nal orders and opinions,128 the data for the 
databases capture any individual database entry or hit. Some database hits are 
duplicate entries.129 Some are procedural orders that I excluded from my 
baseline Administrative O+ce comparison data.130 For these reasons, the 
number of database “hits” I retrieved likely includes a nontrivial number of 
nonmerits decisions or duplicate entries. That means that even the number 
of available database hits for each circuit represents an overly optimistic proxy 
for coverage; not every hit returned in a time-limited search will be a “merits” 
termination within the meaning of the Administrative O+ce’s data. More is 
missing than even these numbers convey. 
Consider the data from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It is 
the only court for which each database search returned more hits than the 
number of merits terminations the court reported it issued during the same 
twelve-month period. That’s actually the trend we might expect from courts that 
make more decisions—especially more procedural decisions and more nonfinal 
decisions—available to the databases. Because the databases generally do not 
screen for content,131 courts that make available both procedural terminations 
and nonfinal orders on free, public-access websites will have greater coverage in 
commercial databases. In those circumstances, a commercial database that 
retrieves and archives all content available for free from a court website would 
return more database hits than the number of merits terminations reported by 
the Administrative Office in any particular twelve-month period.132 
For these reasons, I describe my results in terms of the “maximum 
possible” coverage for each database. That term recognizes that the database 
hits represent only the maximum possible coverage, if we assume that every 
hit is, in fact, a merits termination as the Administrative O+ce de,nes it. 
Because, in reality, not every hit will be a merits termination within the 
meaning of the Administrative O+ce data, “maximum possible” should be 
understood to capture uncertainty as to the actual content of each database—
an inquiry that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Figure # shows the maximum possible coverage of each database across all 
circuits for the twelve-month period ending on September (", #"!*. Although 
 
128 See supra notes !"&–!"' and accompanying text (discussing Table B-!$ data). 
129 The First Circuit search returned approximately twenty duplicates in data for Lexis and 
Bloomberg Law during a single twelve-month period; Westlaw had fewer duplicates. 
130 Approximately eleven percent of the commercial database hits in my First Circuit dataset 
sample were procedural orders. 
131 See supra note !"' (discussing the fact that commercial databases generally do not screen for 
content in federal appellate decision databases, except for purely “housekeeping” orders). 
132 The D.C. Circuit, for example, makes available all “judgments” free of charge on its website, which 
includes both procedural and merits terminations based on the First Circuit dataset. See Judgments Archive, 
U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIR., https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/judgments.nsf 
[https://perma.cc/L(-L-)TX&]; see also infra subsection II.C.$ (discussing First Circuit data on judgments). 
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these percentages are likely overly optimistic for the reasons just discussed, 
they are the best we can say about coverage. At most, only approximately 
seventy percent of court-reported merits terminations from #"!* are available 
on commercial databases across all circuits; only about ,fty percent are 
available on the public-access database, FDsys. 
 
Figure ": Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations for 
Each Database in "#!% 
 
 
Circuit-speci,c data identify expected variations in coverage across the 
circuits.133 Figure ( demonstrates that only one circuit—the D.C. Circuit—
has decisional coverage on par with what we might expect: more database hits 
than the number of merits terminations reported to the Administrative O+ce 
for that year. Coverage for every other circuit in the commercial legal 
databases is worse than the number of merits terminations issued. The Fourth 
Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have better coverage than their peer circuits in 
every database. The First Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit 
have the worst; barely more than ,fty percent of the merits terminations in 
these circuits are available in user-friendly databases. 
  
 
133 See generally Levy, supra note &$ (discussing circuit-level variation and uniformity in case 
management). 
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Figure &: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
Terminations in "#!% 
 
 
Data from the most recent reporting year re.ect better coverage. In the 
twelve-month period ending on September (", #"!&, the geographic circuits 
reported issuing (!,'"& merits decisions.134 Database hits in Bloomberg Law 
and Lexis exceeded that number, suggesting a substantial improvement in 
coverage.135 Coverage in FDsys remained startlingly low, however: only 
!(,(#$ hits, which re.ects less coverage than FDsys had for the year before. 
Westlaw had far less coverage than its competitors: a Westlaw search returned 
only #','#) hits for the same time period. Table # details the numbers by 
circuit, while Figure ' reveals the maximum possible coverage for merits 
terminations across each database. Note that the percentage is greater than 
one-hundred percent for both Lexis and Bloomberg Law, because the 
databases contain more hits than reported merits decisions, likely indicating 
coverage of additional nonmerits or non,nal decisions. 
  
 
134 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
135 Bloomberg Law and Lexis data are surprisingly consistent. Lexis frequently provides access 
to court records for third parties. See, e.g., Myrick v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. !&-""&'$, $"!* 
WL -*%(!&-, at *$ (Oct. $-, $"!*) (describing LexisNexis as “public records vendor” for a consumer 
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Table ": Coverage Across Platforms and Circuits 
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Figure &: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations 
for Each Database in !"#$ 
 
 
The aggregate court-wide data obscure the persistence of inter-circuit 
discrepancies in coverage. Figure ) reveals that improvements in coverage for 
several of the busiest courts (the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the 
Eleventh Circuit) accounted for improved aggregate coverage in #"!&. Other 
circuits—including the First Circuit—continued to have low coverage. 
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Figure !: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
Terminations in "#!$ 
 
 
The developments in #"!& suggest that not all databases are created equal; 
Westlaw’s coverage is lower than its competitors, a finding consistent with prior 
work on coverage issues.136 And FDsys continues to have anemic coverage for 
almost every circuit. Not all circuits are created equal, either. Discrepancies 
vary widely by circuit. Some courts make far more of their output available for 
use in commercial databases; others significantly under-provide decisions to 
commercial databases. And nearly all circuits cheat FDsys—the only aggregate, 
free, and government-run database—of federal appellate decisions. The cause 
of these disparities is beyond the scope of the work I undertake here. But some 
of the discussion in Section II.C may shed light on the source of these 
disparities—namely, what the courts make available for free on their websites. 
Appendix A contains similar figures dating back to the twelve-month 
period ending on September (", #""&. It contains two charts for every year. 
The first figure displays database-wide maximum possible coverage for all 
federal appellate merits terminations during each twelve-month period (like 
Figures # and ' here), and the second shows the per-circuit maximum possible 
coverage for each twelve-month period (like Figures ( and ) here). The story 
is largely the same: year over year, coverage for some circuits is lower than we 
might expect, while coverage for others is more robust. The D.C. Circuit has 
 
136 Kagan et al., supra note !*, at '%'-%% (demonstrating disparity in access to immigration 
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the greatest coverage, by far; the Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit are the 
next best; the First Circuit and the Sixth Circuit are, overall, the worst. 
The historical data reveal an additional anomaly: coverage was generally better 
a decade ago than it has been in recent times—at least in #"!$ and #"!*. For the 
twelve-month period ending on September (", #""&, for example, maximum 
possible coverage of merits terminations was at or near ninety percent across the 
three commercial databases.137 (It was still less than fifty percent in the FDsys.138) 
Although those aggregate numbers are driven, at least in part, by significant 
overages for the D.C. Circuit, eight of the remaining eleven geographic circuits 
had greater than eighty percent coverage that year.139 Contrast that with the 
coverage less than a decade later: in the twelve-month period ending on 
September (", #"!*, coverage dropped below eighty percent in all but three circuits 
(the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit).140 
C. Observations About Missing Decisions 
By now, I have established that significant coverage gaps exist for most 
circuits across the last decade. What we don’t know—and what is much harder 
to determine—is what content is missing from the databases. We can glean 
some insights from a closer examination of the First Circuit’s coverage, but, 
before discussing those results, this section will make a few initial observations 
about what categories of appeals may or may not be missing from the databases. 
!. The Likely Suspects 
Many of us likely assume that what’s missing has little, if any, content, 
and, relatedly, has little value. Kagan, Gill, and Marouf already have 
disproved that assumption by showing that signi,cant gaps in substantive 
immigration appellate decisions exist.141 One might assume that my data only 
con,rm theirs. But the discrepancies are substantial enough that known gaps 
in immigration appeals coverage cannot account for the results. 
Although Administrative O+ce statistics are not su+ciently granular to 
determine the volume of immigration appeals resolved during any twelve-
month period, we know that in the twelve-month period ending on 
September (", #"!*, for example, the courts of appeals only resolved #,$$! 
administrative appeals on the merits.142 Administrative appeals include, but 
 
137 Appendix A, Figure %.!. 
138 Appendix A, Figure %.!. 
139 Appendix A, Figure %.$. 
140 Supra Figure $. 
141 Kagan et al., supra note !*, at '%(-%% (describing gaps in immigration coverage between 
$""% and $"!$). 
142 $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-&. 
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are not limited to, immigration appeals. So, known gaps in immigration 
appeals cannot possibly account for the !","""-decision shortfall in #"!* (see 
Table !). Further, there’s no reason to believe that #"!* was an outlier, given 
the relatively persistent pattern of discrepancies. 
Other presumptively valueless missing decisions remain: one-word orders 
affirming the decision below without reasoning and similarly perfunctory 
orders in original proceedings and miscellaneous applications. Although both 
kinds of decisions may have value as part of the procedural or decisional history 
of a case, these cases may have less value as reasoned or useful precedent. 
None of these categories of unreasoned decisions can, on their own, make 
up the shortfalls in the data (though they could account for the totality of 
what’s missing in any particular circuit). The courts of appeals self-report that 
they issue relatively few purely unreasoned or “without comment” merits 
decisions. Indeed, in #"!& the courts collectively, issued only !,(*( 
“[u]nsigned, [w]ithout [c]omment” decisions.143 Moreover, the vast majority 
of those—or !,!%# of the !,(*(—came from one circuit: the Eighth Circuit.144 
The year before, when the shortfall was much greater, the courts still only 
issued #,&"( unreasoned or “[u]nsigned, [w]ithout [c]omment” decisions.145 
That relatively small volume of decisions—only &.#% of all merits decisions—
cannot account for the gaps in coverage (either on its own or in combination 
with the known gaps for immigration appeals). 
What that also means is that a signi,cant percentage of the missing 
decisions are decisions that, at least according to the Administrative O+ce, 
“expound the law as applied to the facts of the case and detail the judicial 
reasons upon which the judgment is based.”146 That’s assuming that courts 
accurately disclose the percentage of decisions that meet the Administrative 
O+ce’s reasoned-elaboration threshold—a potentially dubious 
proposition.147 What we can say here is that, at least according to the courts 
themselves, most of their output does meet some minimal reason-giving 
threshold; the courts, therefore, have no cause to withhold decisions from free 
and publicly accessible court websites for content reasons (or at least not at 
the levels seen in the data). 
One caveat: some circuits have relied more heavily on “without comment” 
decisions at earlier points in time. Table (, below, shows the percentage of 
“without comment” decisions as a fraction of all merits decisions issued by 
each circuit between #""& and #"!*. Notably, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily 
 
143 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$. 
144 Id. 
145 $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-!$. 
146 Id. n.!. 
147 See McAlister, supra note -), at &*'-($ (discussing poor decisional quality of opinions 
classi+ed as reasoned by appellate courts). 
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on this practice between #"!# and #"!), which could account for coverage gaps 
in that circuit during that time period. But coverage problems persist for the 
Ninth Circuit, despite issuing more reasoned decisions in later years; in #"!*, 
coverage in commercial databases was near seventy percent, and less than 
sixteen percent of the court’s merits decisions were unreasoned. 
 
Table &: Percentage of Unreasoned Merits Terminations148 
 
 !""# !""$ !"%" !"%% !"%! !"%& !"%' !"%( !"%) !"%* 
D.C. Cir. ".$% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% ".$% "."% "."% 
%st Cir. ".!% ".$% ".!% ".$% ".-% !.!% !.-% !.)% !.$% $.-% 
!d Cir. ".!% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% 
&d Cir. $.-% -.%% &.*% &.$% -.'% -.'% &.$% &.-% &.&% ).!% 
'th Cir. "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% 
(th Cir. ".'% ".'% ".)% ".&% ".'% ".&% ".&% ".!% ".!% ".$% 
)th Cir. !.$% ".!% ".!% ".)% ".$% ".!% ".!% ".!% ".!% ".!% 
*th Cir. ).&% $.!% $."% !.-% !.&% ".-% ".'% ".!% "."% ".)% 
#th Cir. )!.$% )(."% )).&% )*."% -(.' &$."% &!.'% &$.%% &-.*% &*.&% 
$th Cir. ".!% ".)% (.!% !%.'% -'.'% -&.&% -&.(% -".-% !%."% !&.*% 
%"th Cir. "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% "."% 
%%th Cir. '.-% &.(% '.'% '.!% $.'% ).!% ).)% )."% !.%% !.%% 
 
Finally, standing on their own, decisions in “original proceedings” also 
cannot account for the shortfalls across all circuits. The Administrative O+ce 
data on unpublished decisions include merits terminations for this category 
of appellate proceedings; for the twelve-month period ending on September 
(", #"!*, for example, the courts resolved approximately $,""" “original 
proceedings” on the “merits.”149 That sizable number still cannot account for 
all missing termination decisions during the same time period (approximately 
!","""). It’s possible that this category of merits terminations, combined with 
immigration appeals and “without comment” decisions, are the sum total of 
what’s missing. But these are sometimes overlapping—and not necessarily 
mutually exclusive—categories, as some unreasoned decisions likely include 
immigration appeals and certainly include “original proceedings.” Data from 
the First Circuit example, moreover, suggest that the story is more 
complicated than missing only “original proceedings.” Although many merits 
 
148 Data reported here derive from comparing the number of “without comment” decisions 
(whether published or not) against the total number of postconsolidation merits decisions issued in 
each circuit every year, as reported in Table B-!$ of the Administrative O,ce’s annual Judicial 
Business publication. See, e.g., $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-&. 
149 Id. 
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terminations in original proceedings likely are missing from commercial 
databases, not all are, and nationally more decisions are missing than this 
category of appellate proceedings alone contains. 
The bottom line: at least a nontrivial portion of what is missing from 
commercial databases are the very decisions we expect the commercial 
databases to have: reasoned, unpublished decisions resolving appeals as of 
right from district courts and administrative agencies. The First Circuit 
example discussed in the next section con,rms this insight. 
#. The First Circuit Example 
Because the volume of what’s missing is so significant, it is beyond the 
scope of this work to offer a comprehensive account of how the decisions have 
gone missing, what they look like, and what value they may have. But I can 
begin to answer those important questions by examining the missing decisions 
in one circuit: the First Circuit. The First Circuit is a particularly good 
example of the missing decisions phenomenon because the court has both 
persistent gaps in coverage and a relatively low volume of appellate activity, 
making it a manageable circuit to examine. In other ways, however, I should 
note that the First Circuit is an outlier. It has one of the highest publication 
rates across the circuits (second only to the D.C. Circuit in #"!* and #"!&).150 
Despite that low unpublication rate, the First Circuit has one of the most 
signi,cant gaps in database coverage for unpublished decisions. In Table ', 
below, I compare the number of unpublished merits terminations the First 
Circuit has reported each year to the number of unpublished decisions 
available for the same corresponding time on Westlaw and Lexis.151 Put in 
terms of relative percentage of maximum possible coverage for unpublished 
merits terminations, coverage ranges from thirty percent to barely more than 
six percent over the last decade, as Table ) demonstrates. 
  
 
150 $"!( JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note $!, tbl.B-!$; $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-!$. 
151 Bloomberg Law and FDsys do not permit +ltering by publication status, so these charts do 
not include that data. 
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Table ': Number of Unpublished First Circuit Decisions Available on 
Commercial Databases 
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Table (: Percentage of Unpublished First Circuit Decisions Available on 
Commercial Databases 
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How does this happen? The First Circuit triages its appellate decisions, 
explaining that due to the “volume of ,lings” it “cannot dispose of each case 
by opinion.”152 “Opinion,” its Local Rules suggest, is a term of art—perhaps 
used to be consistent with the E-Government Act of #""#.153 The First 
Circuit issues three types of decisions in appeals: “order, memorandum and 
 
152 !ST CIR. R. )'."(a). 
153 See Pub. L. No. !"*-)-*, § $"&, !!' Stat. $(%%, $%!) (codi+ed at -- U.S.C. § )&"! note). 
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order, or opinion.”154 “[S]ome opinions are rendered in unpublished form; 
that is, the opinions are directed to the parties but are not published in West’s 
Federal Reporter.”155 Although it is the court’s policy to “prefer” that 
“opinions . . . be published,” sometimes they are issued in unpublished 
form.156 Ultimately, these unpublished “opinions” are what the commercial 
databases ,nd, because “opinions”—whether published or not—are the 
decisions that the court posts to its website and makes freely available to the 
public. All types of “unpublished” adjudications in the First Circuit—
including opinions, memoranda, and orders—may be cited for their 
persuasive value.157 But only “opinions” are easy and free to ,nd. 
The First Circuit’s website also exposes the problem—if you look 
carefully. Its “opinion search” feature contains only a fraction of the merits 
decisions the court issues each year—that is, only the cases that it has formally 
resolved with an “opinion.”158 The rest of its adjudications—those resolved 
with orders or memoranda—are hidden behind a PACER paywall under the 
label “judgments.” Some of these judgements are extensive, with several 
pages of reasoned explanation.159 Others are perfunctory.160 
  
 
154 !ST CIR. R. )'."(a). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at )$.!."(a) (“An unpublished judicial opinion, order, judgment or other written 
disposition of this court may be cited regardless of the date of issuance. The court will consider such 
dispositions for their persuasive value but not as binding precedent.”). 
158 U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Opinions, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FIRST CIR., http://media.ca!.uscourts.gov/opinions/ (enter desired search parameters). 
159 See, e.g., Bogosian v. Hall, No. !&–!'(! (!st Cir. Jan. -, $"!*); Stalcup v. Naval Special 
Warfare Command, No. !&–$!"* (!st Cir. Feb. (, $"!*); United States v. Suarez-Rodriguez, No. !&-
$&!! (!st Cir. Feb. ), $"!*). 
160 See, e.g., Sloan v. Hearst Media Co., No. !'–!((&, slip op. at ! (!st Cir. Oct. $(, $"!') (“After 
careful de novo review of the record and the parties’ submissions, we a,rm the dismissal of the 
complaint, substantially for the reasons adopted by the district court.”); In re Lewis, Nos. !'–!"&- 
& !'–!)%(, slip op. at ! (!st Cir. Nov. !-, $"!') (similar); Reedom v. Colvin, No. !'–!&)!, slip op. at 
! (!st Cir. May (, $"!*) (similar). 
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First, let’s ,nd these judgments. “Judgments” are available only by 
logging into the PACER system on the First Circuit’s website. When you do, 





At the top of the screen, it is easy to spot the distinction the First Circuit 
draws: “opinions” are separated from “orders/judgments.” Clicking on the 





From here, you can isolate orders, judgments, opinions, dispositive entries 
only, and per curiam (or unsigned) entries only. Not every dispositive entry 
has an “opinion,” and only opinions are available through the main circuit 
webpage. Neither the “opinion” search feature, nor the judgment search 
feature are keyword searchable, but both may be searched using a date 
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limitation (or by case number). Note that the judgments search page makes 
clear that each search will incur PACER fees—fees that may exceed the “(" 
page limit on PACER charges.” Each search, therefore, may cost more than 
/(."" (at !" cents per page) if the search returns more than (" pages.161 
Further, retrieval of each judgment incurs an additional !" cent per-page fee, 
as the Download Con,rmation screen here warns me before asking whether 





After reviewing the website, I hypothesized that “judgments” without 
“opinions” were largely what was missing from the First Circuit data on 
Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law. Because the databases each report that 
they depend on court websites and other public-source material for their data, 
if judgments issued without separate opinions are hidden behind paywalls, 
then they may be retrieved infrequently (if at all). 
To test this hypothesis, a research assistant and I ran searches for twelve 
months’ worth of judgments corresponding with the Administrative O+ce 
reporting year ending on September (", #"!*. We exported each month’s 
worth of data into an Excel spreadsheet. Because these judgments often have 
signi,cant docket text, as the next screen shot demonstrates, we were able to 
code the decisions from the docket sheet alone as “merits,” “procedural,” or 
 
161 I incurred approximately 0(!.'" in PACER fees to retrieve the First Circuit dataset and 
related data used in this Article. See E-mail from Do_Not_Reply@psc.uscourts.gov to author (Oct. 
!$, $"!% -:!* AM) (on +le with author) (indicating a quarterly balance due of 0(!.'"). Once I 
obtained a complete list of judgments during the relevant time period from PACER, I used 
Bloomberg Law’s docket-based search to retrieve each individual missing decision; I almost always 
had to “update” the docket on Bloomberg Law and/or request the judgment (a feature that is free to 
users, like me, with an academic account). 
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“disciplinary” and identify the outcome of the proceeding (“a+rmed,” 





Our twelve-month collection of judgments compares favorably with the data 
the First Circuit reported to the Administrative Office for the same period. 
Table $ compares the data we collected through the judgment search to the 
Administrative Office statistics. The third column indicates the rate of capture. 
The bottom line: a “judgments” search captures all decisional output from the 
First Circuit, whether procedural terminations or merits terminations. 
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But not all “judgments” are available for free on the court website. Only 
($! or (%.%% of the judgments we coded as “merits” terminations had a 
corresponding “opinion” available on the First Circuit website. One hundred 
percent of those ($! judgments with a corresponding opinion on the court’s 
public website were also available on Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law. 
Overall, however, only '"$ or ''.%% of the judgments we coded as merits 
decisions were available on each of the three commercial databases. The 
databases only captured forty-,ve additional merits terminations—that is, 
forty-,ve additional merits decisions that did not appear on the court 
website—during the relevant twelve-month period. 
Coverage for procedural decisions was, as expected, much worse. Less than 
four percent of reported procedural terminations appeared on the court 
website as opinions (all of which also appeared in the commercial databases). 
About forty-one additional procedural terminations were findable on the 
commercial databases—roughly the same number of additional findable merits 
terminations (forty-five, as discussed above). Table * breaks down the data. 
 
Table %: Availability of First Circuit Merits and Procedural Terminations in 
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162 The Administrative O,ce statistics can be found on Tables B-& (merits) and B-&A 
(procedural). $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-&A ($"!*); id. tbl.B-&. 
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Recall that “merits terminations” and “procedural terminations” within the 
meaning of the Administrative Office statistics include more than decisions in 
traditional appeals as of right; the Administrative Office also includes decisions 
in original proceedings and miscellaneous applications within these termination 
numbers. We isolated appeals as of right from original proceedings in our dataset 
based on the type of outcome (affirmed/vacated/remanded/reversed versus 
granted/denied). Of the &*! merits judgments collected (see Table $), $#) (or *#%) 
involved appeals resulting in an affirmance, vacatur, reversal, or enforcement of 
a district court decision or administrative order. 
Two hundred eighty-four of the $#) merits terminations in appeals as of 
right in the dataset never made it to the First Circuit’s website; the clear 
majority of those #&' decisions—#)( of the #&' or &%%—were also missing 
from each of the commercial databases. Eleven decisions could be found on 
one or more databases but were not available on all three. Table & examines 
the coverage for appeals as of right from a district court or administrative 
agency resolved on the merits. Only slightly more than half of those appeals 
resulted in decisions posted on the court website, and slightly less than sixty 
percent of merits appeals were ,ndable using commercial databases. 
 
Table $: Availability of First Circuit Merits Terminations in Appeals as of Right 
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To understand the impact of what’s missing, we pulled copies of every 
judgment missing from all three commercial databases o- of Bloomberg 
Law’s dockets database (which is equivalent to PACER but more user-
friendly and free for academics).163 Of the missing decisions, the majority—
but not all—a+rmed the judgment below. Some—like the result discussed in 
Mr. Jones’s case in the introduction164—involved favorable results for the 
appellant. The missing decisions dataset contained no outright reversals, 
 
163 See supra note !$$ (describing Bloomberg Law’s available databases). 
164 See supra notes !–' and accompanying text (discussing the Jones case). 
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however. Table % indicates the outcome in the missing decisions. As might be 
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The missing decisions are largely reasoned—meaning that they usually cite 
to legal authority to support the result and almost always give some explanation 
for the result. That is to say, there are no one-word affirmances among the 
missing decisions dataset.165 Table !" shows the mean and median word count 
for the missing decisions, as well as the range in length of the missing decisions; 
some say quite a lot and some, as we might expect, say little. Table !! 
demonstrates that the majority of the decisions cite to at least some case law 
authority to support the result, but )! of the #)( decisions (or approximately 
#"%) do not cite to any case law. There were also twenty-eight decisions in which 
the court noted that criminal defense counsel had filed a brief under Anders v. 
California.166 Excluding the Anders appeals and those decisions that cite no law, 
at least seventy percent of the missing decisions arguably have some value as 
precedent insofar as they explain and apply the law to a set of identified (and 
potentially unique) facts. The rest may still have some value as an indication that 




165 Not all of the decisions provide satisfying reasons, however; decisions that do no more than 
a,rm for the reasons given by the district court may be inadequate to resolve an appeal. See 
McAlister, supra note -), at &**-($ (arguing that courts should not use reasoning-through-
incorporation where appellant has challenged the district court’s reasoning or otherwise responded 
to district court decision on appeal). A handful of the decisions in the dataset o#ered reasoning only 
by way of reference to a district court decision. See supra note !'" (identifying decisions that explain 
outcome based on district court’s reasoning). 
166 )(' U.S. *)( (!%'*) (holding that a defense attorney can seek withdrawal from 
representation if no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal exist provided that they conduct a full 
examination of the proceedings before concluding that no grounds exist). 
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Table !!: Citation Information for Missing Decisions in First Circuit Dataset 
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The missing decisions were significantly more likely to involve pro se 
appellants than was true for pro se terminations more generally in the First 
Circuit during the same time period. For the twelve month period ending on 
September (", #"!*, '$* of the !,'*# case terminations (including both merits and 
procedural terminations) involved pro se litigants (or (!.*%).167 The First Circuit 
had the lowest volume of pro se litigation across the circuits.168 In the dataset of 
missing decisions, however, nearly half or '%.'% of terminations involved pro se 
appellants. It was more than twice as likely that a missing judgment involved a 
criminal appeal ($*.!%) than was true for all merits terminations in the First 
Circuit during the same time period ((!.$% of merits terminations were 
criminal).169 Table !# describes the frequency of various categories of appeals 




167 $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-%. 
168 McAlister, supra note -), at &&&-&%, fig.!" (discussing pro se appellate litigation across all circuits 
and comparing the First Circuit’s relatively low )&.-% rate of appeals commenced by pro se plaintiffs). 
169 $"!* JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note (, tbl.B-&. 
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Table !": Types of Appeals in First Circuit Missing Decisions Dataset (n+"(&) 
 
Types Number 
Number of Pro Se Appellants !#) ('%.'% of all missing) 
Criminal Appeals (including 
Motions to Vacate Sentence) 
!*" ($*.!% of all missing) 
Number of Civil Rights Appeals 
(including Employment) 
(" 
Number of Prisoner Appeals 
(including Habeas) 
!$ 
Number of Foreclosure Appeals ) 
Immigration Appeals ' 
Number of Bankruptcy Appeals ' 




Although some of the absolute numbers of these categories are not 
particularly signi,cant, together they account for #(! of the #)( missing 
judgments, or %!.(%. Unfortunately, Administrative O+ce statistics are not 
su+ciently granular to help us assess what overall percentage of terminations 
in the First Circuit involve these categories of cases. Su+ce it to say, however, 
that only a handful (if any) of these missing decisions involve the kinds of 
complex civil disputes that others have observed frequently receive the most 
attention from the federal appellate courts.170 And none appeared to involve 
cases that had proceeded to oral argument only to end in a missing decision; 
these were all appeals that involved the minimum amount of appellate process 
(brie,ng and decision). 
Finally, to the extent that word count may be a meaningful proxy for 
substance, it appears that the missing decisions from these categories of 
cases—the categories identi,ed in Table !#—are likely to be substantive. 
Table !( identi,es the mean word count of missing decisions by nature of suit. 
What’s striking is that even though the absolute numbers of missing decisions 
in some categories are small (for example, for prisoner appeals and Social 
Security/Medicare appeals), the mean word count suggests, again, that the 




170 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note $%, at $*&-*' (describing the two-track system of 
federal appellate process); see also Vladeck & Gulati, supra note (*, at !''( & n.) ($""&) (same); 
Pether, supra note $%, at !--, !-'"-'! (criticizing less rigorous tracks of appellate decisionmaking). 
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Table !&: Word Count by Nature of Suit in First Circuit Missing Decisions Dataset 
 
Nature Average Word Count 
Criminal (excluding Anders) (n,#&!) #)).% 
Civil Rights (including Employment) (n,%") ("!.# 
Prisoner Appeals (including Habeas) (n,#() '!*.& 
Foreclosure Appeals (n,') !(*.& 
Immigration Appeals (n,&) $$.( 
Bankruptcy Appeals (n,&) $(.( 
Social Security and Medicare Appeals (n,!) )!$.) 
 
The First Circuit’s missing decisions may be exceptional; more work 
should be done on missing decisions before we can extrapolate with confidence 
based on the First Circuit example. But if the First Circuit is representative 
of the problem, then we can no longer afford to ignore what’s missing. 
III. WHY CARE? 
Because the missing decisions involve unpublished decisions—decisions 
that make no law and supposedly involve only routine issues171—some may be 
less concerned that these decisions are “missing” from commercial databases. 
Indeed, some may conclude the courts have curated the most helpful 
precedent, thereby protecting us from information overload. 
This Part makes the case for why we should care about missing decisions. 
I will offer two reasons: access to precedent and access to systemic information 
about the courts themselves. First, in a post–Rule (#.! world where all 
unpublished decisions are citable and have persuasive value,172 the 
submergence of any useful circuit-level precedent is inexcusable. If the courts 
are worried about information overload, that’s why search algorithms exist. 
More problematic, in my view, is the risk that the submergence of certain kinds 
of cases—civil rights and criminal appeals involving constitutional duties, in 
particular—may have a distortion effect on the law. At least some of what’s 
 
171 As one jurist explained, 
Today, courts use unpublished opinions to issue quick, reasoned decisions in routine 
cases based on settled precedent. For example, thousands of petitions to review 
deportations and denials of Social Security bene+ts turn on discrete facts determined 
by administrative law judges; hearing oral arguments and issuing published opinions 
in most would only delay decisions that should be speedy. 
William H. Pryor, Jr., Opinion, Conservatives Should Oppose Expanding the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. $%, $"!*), https://www.nytimes.com/$"!*/!!/$%/opinion/conservatives-expanding-federal-
courts.html [https://perma.cc/P)LW-PHY)]. 
172 FED. R. APP. P. )$.!. 
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missing reflects settled law that—if not for its relative invisibility—otherwise 
might shape the rights of citizens and duties of state actors.173 
Second, even if missing decisions o-er little precedential value, the 
missing decisions nevertheless contain and constitute essential information 
about the federal appellate court system itself. Our inability to navigate 
what’s missing thwarts any e-ort to assess the size, scope, and attributes of 
the second (or third?) tier of federal appellate justice to which the courts 
appear to shunt certain classes of litigants (pro se) and certain types of cases 
(criminal) more often than others. 
These are not the only reasons why the missing decisions matter; there 
are other reasons why we should care, which I will only touch upon brie.y.174 
Limiting easy and useful access to any appellate level decision will have 
distortion e-ects for both empiricists and practitioners—separate and apart 
from the more normative concerns I address in this Part. This work reveals 
signi,cant sampling bias risks for empirical work at the circuit-level using 
commercial databases—biases that researchers have acknowledged at the 
district court level175 but may not have appreciated at the circuit level.176 For 
practitioners, there are distortion e-ects as well. Appellate decisions not 
included in commercial databases skew the procedural history information of 
the district court decisions otherwise included in those databases. Precisely 
for this reason, Lexis explained that it does not screen one-word a+rmances 
from its database: “[A] one-word a+rmance would be highly valuable as part 
 
173 See Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, %( TEX. L. REV. '*, !!% ($"!%) 
(“Modern civil rights litigation rests on the premise that law indeed becomes settled . . . . Citizens 
may rely on the eminently reasonable assumption that o,cials will abide by settled law, and they 
may seek compensation when o,cials fail to do so.”). 
174 Some might also argue, persuasively, that missing decisions re.ect a pedestrian example of 
the problems with “secret law” that James J. Brudney, Deborah Jones Merritt, and Dakota S. Rudesill 
have discussed. See Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, * HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 
$-!, )"( n.$)) ($"!&) (noting some less troubling forms of secret law, including private or con+dential 
legal documents); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts 
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, &- VAND. L. REV. *!, !!* ($""!) (arguing that limited 
publication of judicial decisions inhibits the ability of parties to track variations in the application 
of legal rules to fact sets). 
175 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, '& STAN. L. REV. !$"), !$!- ($"!)) (discussing incompleteness in Westlaw and Lexis’ 
databases for empirical work on district court decisions); Ho#man et al., supra note !-, at '(' (same); 
see also McCuskey, supra note !', at &$$ (“It is well-documented that district-court opinions selected 
for the print reporter volumes (the Federal Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions) may not be 
representative of decision-making, and that therefore reliance solely on reported decisions to study 
judicial behavior risks biased results.”). 
176 See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note !%, at !!($-(), !!() n.%* (relying on Westlaw to conduct empirical 
work on recusals by federal circuit judges and noting that a Westlaw representative “do[es] not believe there 
are any U.S. Court of Appeals decisions that are not on Westlaw in some format”); see also supra note $" 
(collecting statements assuming breadth of Westlaw and Lexis coverage for unpublished decisions). 
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of the overall case history in Shepard’s.”177 Missing federal appellate decisions 
thus may lead to inaccurate Shepard’s reports for district court decisions that 
are otherwise available in commercial databases. 
A. Meaningful Access to Precedent 
Some of what’s missing has value as precedent. That is true, generally, of 
unpublished decisions, which scholars have recognized are capable of making 
“important contributions to common law” and sometimes vary little “in 
complexity or importance” from their published counterparts.178 By now, 
there’s widespread agreement that unpublished adjudications are worthy of 
scholarly attention and that courts use unpublished adjudications in 
meaningful—and sometimes deleterious—ways.179 Unpublished decisions are 
not decisions we should ignore. 
We have also abandoned the unsophisticated view of “precedent” that 
adhered to the early use of unpublished decisions. Precedent is not an “all-or-
nothing proposition.”180 Thanks to Rule (#.! (and the overwhelming scholarly 
criticism that paved its way), we are now free, according to one scholar, “to 
draw compelling analogies to nonbinding precedents,” even when courts label 
those precedents “unpublished” or “non-precedential.”181 
From this perspective—the perspective of those who defeated no-citation 
bans and challenged their narrow conception of precedent—the discovery of 
missing decisions raises the specter of a foe believed to have already been 
vanquished. Navigable access to federal appellate decisions was a problem 
that was thought to be solved long ago—and long before Rule (#.! ensured 
 
177 E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note )$. 
178 Denise M. Keele, Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donalad W. Floyed & Lianjun Zhang, An 
Analysis of Ideological E!ects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, ' J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. $!), $!( ($""%). 
179 See, e.g., Pether, supra note $%, at !-)' n.- (examining e#ects of unpublication scheme on 
litigants’ ability to manipulate precedent); Richman & Reynolds, supra note $%, at $*&-*' (examining 
deleterious e#ects of unpublication scheme on the behavior of judges, clerks, and litigants); Keele 
et al., supra note !*(, at $!) (recognizing that empiricists should take unpublished adjudications into 
account because the “process of judicial decision making in the courts of appeals di#ers between 
published and unpublished opinions” and cautioning scholars from “drawing conclusions from 
examinations of published opinions alone”). 
180 See Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, && HASTINGS 
L.J. !$)&, !$)' ($""-) (“[The] conception of precedent re.ected in the no-citation rules appears 
incomplete or distorted.”); see also Pether, supra note $%, at !&$" (“[Dissenting judges] conceived of 
precedent broadly: ‘Each ruling, published or unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and 
the application of law—to the case. Therefore, all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not, 
and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citations.’” (quoting Rules 
of Tenth Circuit, %&& F.$d )', )* (!"th Cir. !%%$) (Holloway, C.J., concurring and dissenting))). 
181 Pearson, supra note !(", at !$)'-)* (describing scholarly commentary on the practice of 
“non-precedential precedent” in the federal appellate courts as “overwhelmingly negative”). 
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that unpublished decisions could be used. Missing decisions are useful only 
to the parties who know of their existence already, because the decisions are 
un,ndable using traditional legal research tools. 
Although the courts lifted no-citation bans more than a decade ago, in 
some circuits those citation bans remain, functionally speaking, if reams of 
decisions never make their way to user-friendly commercial databases. A 
decision like Jones v. Gelb,182 which began this Article, cannot be used if it is 
not found or ,ndable using traditional tools—unless, by chance, someone is 
already aware of its existence. Some unpublished decisions, then, actually are 
unpublished. Neither a law clerk nor a lawyer looking for cases involving 
“pepper spray” in the First Circuit would ever ,nd Jones v. Gelb. 
Even so, are these missing decisions really worth finding? Are they useful 
as “precedent,” however loosely defined? Take a look at the relevant portion 
from Jones v. Gelb,183 the decision highlighted in the first paragraph of this 
Article.184 The decision has more than !,""" words, and, as to the portion of the 
district court’s summary judgment decision that it vacated, the court explained: 
After a thorough review of the record and of the parties’ submissions, we 
a!rm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
Preliminarily, we note that we have reviewed the video of the August 
"##$ incident, but the video is of poor quality, and the interactions between 
the plainti%/appellant, Antonio Jones (“Jones”), and the o!cers present are 
not always in full view; thus, the video is of limited usefulness at this stage. 
We must review the rest of the record in the light most favorable to Jones 
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. 
We conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendant/appellee Steven R. Legere (“Legere”) on Jones’ claim 
that the use of pepper spray during the August "##$ incident infringed the 
plainti% ’s Eighth Amendment rights. According to Jones, while he was seated 
on the ground in full arm and leg restraints (and having recently undergone 
knee surgery), Legere sprayed him “multiple times” with pepper spray and 
told him to “die quick.” We note that the video depiction of this incident does 
not materially refute Jones’ description of the events (although it is not 
adequate to con&rm the key points of his claim, either). If a reasonable jury 
were to accept these factual allegations as true, that jury might also conclude 
that the use of force here was not part of a good faith e%ort to restore 
discipline, i.e., to get Jones to stand on his own as instructed, and that, 
instead, the force was used with a malicious purpose. If the leg and arm 
 
182 See supra notes !–' and accompanying text (discussing Jones); infra note !(& and 
accompanying text (excerpting Jones). 
183 Jones v. Gelb, No. !&-!'(" (!st Cir. Mar. $), $"!*) (on +le with author). 
184 See supra notes !–' and accompanying text. 
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restraints—along with Jones’ post-surgical condition—left Jones physically 
incapable of complying with Legere’s command to get up o% the 'oor, a jury 
might conclude that Legere could not reasonably have expected that applying 
pepper spray would achieve the desired result, i.e., that it would cause Jones 
to stand up willingly on his own. A jury might conclude, instead, that the 
pepper spray was used for a malicious purpose, in that Legere’s alleged hostile 
statement (“die quick”) suggests that Legere was motivated out of anger 
and/or by an intention to in'ict pain rather than to gain Jones’ compliance. 
The fact that Jones apparently did not su%er a serious injury as a result 
of this incident is not dispositive. “The ‘core judicial inquiry’ [is] ‘not whether 
a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was 
applied in a good-faith e%ort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 
and sadistically to cause harm.” We cannot conclude at this stage of the 
proceedings that Legere is entitled to quali&ed immunity, either.185 
This is hardly a useless decision. Some may be surprised that such a 
decision—especially one in favor of a prisoner on an Eighth Amendment 
claim—has been rendered essentially useless by the First Circuit’s decisional 
issuance scheme. Of course, not all “missing decisions” are as signi,cant as 
this one, but at least some are.186 
Jones’s status as a “missing decision” may well have mattered to litigants 
in the First Circuit, especially if subsequent litigation is any indication. 
Whether use of force in the circumstances of Jones is malicious and thus 
unconstitutional is a fact-sensitive, totality-of-the-circumstances question.187 
In two appeals decided after Jones, the First Circuit found the circumstances 
alleged wanting; it rejected two civil rights claims by incarcerated persons 
who, like Mr. Jones, alleged unconstitutional use of pepper spray.188 Although 
neither case is just like Jones, surely the litigants (and the court) might have 
wanted the bene,t of Jones when deciding whether other similar uses of force 
to coerce compliance crossed the constitutional line. 
All three decisions may have been right as a matter of fact and law, but the 
inability of litigants, courts, and constitutional actors to have access to Jones is 
a troubling problem. That the only decision favorable to the civil rights claimant 
 
185 Jones, No. !&-!'(", slip op. at $ (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
186 See also United States v. Bravo-Garcia, No. !'-!$&(, slip op. at ) (!st Cir. July !", $"!*) 
(vacating criminal sentence because procedurally unreasonable); Crawford v. Blue, No. !&-!&-&, slip 
op. at $ (!st Cir. Oct. !-, $"!') (vacating decision in favor of pro se civil rights plainti#); Bogosian 
v. Hall, No. !&-!'(!, slip op. at & (!st Cir. Jan. -, $"!*) (vacating, in part, denial of motion for 
summary judgment on quali+ed immunity). Crawford and Bravo-Garcia have been reproduced in 
their original form in Appendix B. 
187 Staples v. Gerry, %$) F.)d *, !* (!st Cir. $"!%) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, ** F.)d *&', 
*') (-th Cir. !%%')). 
188 Underwood v. Barrett, %$- F.)d !%, $"-$! (!st Cir. $"!%); Staples, %$) F.)d at !*-!(. 
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is missing underscores the capacity of missing decisions to distort the law 
itself—not simply frustrate our ability to access it. To proceed to trial, Mr. Jones 
had to pierce the officer’s qualified immunity—that is, he needed to show that 
the officer’s conduct violated law that was “clearly established” under “cases of 
controlling authority” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”189 Alan 
Trammell has described this as a “settled law” requirement; once the law 
becomes “settled,” the violation of those settled rights and duties is actionable 
in a federal civil rights suit.190 Section !%&(, therefore, “imbues precedents with 
binding significance in the real world.”191 Trammell explains further: “More 
concretely, precedents create affirmative legal obligations for state officials, 
even if those officials were not parties to the precedent-making lawsuits.”192 
Were it not submerged, Jones would put corrections o+cers on notice of 
their legal obligation not to in.ict pain or use pepper spray on inmates out of 
malice (irrespective of injury). Jones is not only evidence of what the law is; 
it is the law in the First Circuit. And, apparently, no other case so holds, 
because the First Circuit cited to Ninth Circuit precedent to support its 
rejection of the o+cer’s quali,ed immunity claim.193 An issuance scheme that 
frustrates access to a decision like Jones does far more than make it di+cult 
for some litigants to ,nd useful precedent; it actually impedes a citizen’s 
ability to vindicate his or her constitutional rights. 
Lest one think I have placed too much weight on Jones, consider this 
missing decision from the Seventh Circuit.194 In Bey v. Schwartz,195 the court 
remanded a prisoner civil rights claim that the district court had wrongly 
dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, which holds that a plaintiff may not use '# 
U.S.C. § !%&( to challenge the validity of his conviction (impliedly or 
otherwise).196 The court explained in a succinct order that Mr. Bey had not 
 
189 Wilson v. Layne, &$' U.S. '"), '!* (!%%%); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, -&* U.S. ("", (!( (!%($) 
(explaining that the trial judge may appropriately determine whether the law was “clearly established” 
on a motion for summary judgment related to the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct). 
190 See Trammell, supra note !*), at !!%; see also Alan M. Trammell, The Constitutionality of 
Nationwide Injunctions, %! U. COLO. L. REV. %**, %((-(% ($"$") (explaining that the law around 
§ !%() is settled and enforceable). 
191 Trammell, supra note !%", at %(%. 
192 Id. 
193 See Jones v. Gelb, No. !&-!'(", slip op. at $-) (!st Cir. Mar. $), $"!*) (citing Furnace v. 
Sullivan, *"& F.)d !"$!, !"$*-)" (%th Cir. $"!))). The Court also cited to Fourth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, 
and Eighth Circuit decisions in support of its determination that Jones had supported his claim that 
the officer’s action was motivated by malice or anger and not to obtain compliance. Id. at $. 
194 I am grateful to Joel Flaxman for bringing this example to my attention. 
195 No. !$–!)*), $"!$ WL !)$!!((', at *! (*th Cir. May $%, $"!$). At some point after completing 
this draft in $"$" and its publication in $"$!, Westlaw added Bey to its database (presumably at the 
request of a customer). Notably, many of the cases that cite to Bey in the district courts do so without 
having a “WL” citation. See infra note !%( (collecting cases). 
196 &!$ U.S. -**, -(%-%" (!%%-). 
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run afoul of Heck because his contention was “that state prison officials held 
him for longer than the state judiciary authorized,” which was “not a challenge 
to the state court’s decisions”; rather, it was “an argument that the prison 
system failed to implement the state courts’ decisions and thus defendants 
have deprived him of liberty without due process of law.”197 Apparently, prison 
officials may have a habit of detaining a prisoner for longer than authorized 
by law in the Southern District of Illinois because Mr. Bey’s case has been 
cited more than half a dozen times by judges in the Southern District of 
Illinois evaluating the sufficiency of complaints raising similar claims.198 Bey’s 
utility is plain, and it likely has evaded obscurity only because district court 
decisions citing to it have made its reasoning accessible through Westlaw.199 
At its core, the existence of missing decisions frustrates the reasons why 
precedential constraint is desirable: fairness, e+ciency, and predictability.200 
The screening of decisions makes it di+cult to determine whether our 
appellate courts are treating like cases alike (fairness).201 It obscures useful 
decisions from litigants, lower courts, and the public, leaving more work for 
those applying the law in similar circumstances (e+ciency). It leaves others 
in the dark about how similar cases were, in fact, resolved (predictability). 
The discovery of missing decisions, thus, reignites the concerns scholars 
raised over “the accountability, consistency, predictability, and fairness” of 
unpublished decisions that Rule (#.! and the E-Government Act were meant 
to address (at least in part).202 The presence and extent of missing decisions 
suggest that both Rule (#.! and the E-Government Act have failed to achieve 
 
197 Bey, $"!$ WL !)$!!((', at *!-$ (*th Cir. May $%, $"!$). The Seventh Circuit later clari+ed 
that the type of claim Mr. Bey raised is best analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. Childress v. 
Walker, *(* F.)d -)), -)(-)% (*th Cir. $"!&). 
198 Johnson v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., No. !(–"!*%", $"!( WL '-)(&(", at *- n.- (S.D. Ill. Dec, *, 
$"!(); Evans v. IDOC, No. !*–*'), $"!( WL !*&*&)', at *) n.) (S.D. Ill. Apr. !$, $"!(); Evans v. 
Illinois, No. !*–*'), $"!* WL &%*$%%(, at *$, *- nn.$ & - (S.D. Ill. Nov. )", $"!*); Dixson v. Foster, 
No. !'-$-), $"!' WL ))-'"&&, at *$ (S.D. Ill. June !', $"!'); Farris v. Party, No. !'–)"$, $"!' WL 
)$&-&!-, at *$ (S.D. Ill. June !-, $"!'); West v. Waggoner, No. !'–!(%, $"!' WL )$&-&!", at *$ (S.D. 
Ill. June !-, $"!'); Mosley v. Davis, No. !-–**&, $"!- WL )*)-!*!, at *$ (S.D. Ill. July $%, $"!-). 
199 One might say that, as a result, Bey isn’t “missing” after all. But imagine whether it would be findable 
outside of the limited universe of the Southern District of Illinois, where it seems to have made the rounds. 
200 See Schauer, supra note %!, at &%&-%', &%% (explaining how precedential constraints on 
judicial decisionmaking are rooted in fairness, predictability, and e,ciency); see also Peter W. 
Martin, Recon%guring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, &) VILL. L. REV. !, ( 
($""() (“[P]recedent . . . not only induces consistency in adjudication, but also casts a long shadow 
beyond. Precedent informs private decisions about whether to litigate, how to structure negotiated 
settlements or business transactions, and whether and, if so, how to proceed with other activities 
posing potential legal consequences or risks.”). 
201 See also Hellman Statement, supra note &* (arguing that access to unpublished decisions 
ensures that “courts satisfy their obligations of accountability”). 
202 See Pether, supra note $%, at !-('-(* (discussing perils of “private judging” resulting from 
unpublished decision practices, including risk that “similarly situated litigants [are] being treated differently”). 
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their most fundamental transparency goals, depriving litigants, scholars, and 
the courts of access to useful precedent in the process. 
I have, of course, highlighted particularly powerful examples of valuable 
missing decisions—and I’ve included a few more in Appendix B. Some may 
wonder—especially given that so many missing decisions a+rm the district 
court’s decision203—whether many missing decisions actually have 
precedential value. The appellate-level reasoning that is “missing” may well 
be duplicative of reasoning that’s already out there—either in other published 
or visible unpublished decisions or, perhaps, in the lower court decision that 
the missing decision a+rms. The latter is a problematic assumption, given 
the well-documented access issues for district court decisions that Boyd, Kim, 
and Schlanger recently explored.204 And while some—and perhaps even 
many—missing decisions likely are duplicative of reasoning already available 
to us in other forms, that’s surely not always the case, as Bey and Jones both 
illustrate (the former becoming useful precedent in the Southern District of 
Illinois and the latter relying chie.y on out-of-circuit precedent to defend its 
result). More generally, we cannot assume that a+rmances merely reiterate 
what has occurred below, because appellate courts remain free to a+rm on 
any basis appearing in the record.205 
Given, moreover, how case- and fact-specific many affirmances may be—
especially in certain areas of the law, including qualified immunity 
dispositions—the affirmance itself has value in its context. It may demonstrate 
approval of the district court’s reasoning—either in whole or in part. 
Understanding the scope of that approval has value; for example, in the qualified 
immunity context, the reviewing court may agree only that a constitutional right 
was not clearly established—choosing not to endorse a district court’s view of 
the underlying constitutional issue (assuming one may have been given).206 If 
the appellate-level decision is not easily locatable or readily usable but the 
district court decision is, bench and bar alike might wrongly assume that the 
district court decision reflects an accurate view of the law. This might create 
fertile ground for what Maggie Gardner has recently identified as “dangerous 
citations”—that is, “error introduced in district court opinions” that later gets 
picked up and reused in district courts and (worse, yet) appellate courts.207 
 
203 See supra Table %. 
204 See Boyd et al., supra note !-, at -(% (“[T]here is signi+cant variation in the types of cases 
and motion activity that are visible across data sources, and those di#erences will often lead to 
di#ering conclusions about those cases and about judicial behavior.”). 
205 See, e.g., Ross–Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., $!* F.)d (, !"-!! (!st Cir. $""") 
(“Moreover, we do not consider ourselves bound by the trial court’s rationale, but may a,rm its 
judgment for any valid reason that +nds support in the record.”). 
206 See Pearson v. Callahan, &&& U.S. $$), $)' ($""%) (overruling mandatory sequencing of legal 
questions to resolve quali+ed immunity issues). 
207 Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, %& N.Y.U. L. REV. !'!%, !'$$ ($"$"). 
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B. Missing Decisions as “Systemic Facts” 
Irrespective of their utility as precedent, the missing decisions matter still. 
They are facts about the federal appellate system itself—that is, these are what 
Andrew Crespo calls “systemic facts.”208 This new category of judicial factual 
material involves facts that are neither adjudicative nor legislative, as Kenneth 
Culp Davis famously described.209 Unlike their more well-known counterparts, 
“systemic facts” concern “broader phenomena” about “the judiciary itself”; 
these facts permit the courts—and the parties who use them—to “look inward” 
at the system.210 Such facts may be marshalled as an institutional check on the 
system, too211—but only if we enjoy meaningful access to them. 
Collectively, the missing decisions represent a significant percentage of the 
federal appellate courts’ merits docket—indeed, nearly thirty percent in most 
years over the last decade.212 Even where the decisions themselves may not 
have persuasive value, together, the missing decisions are a rich reservoir of 
data about how the federal courts adjudicate certain types of appeals—
especially those appeals affecting the least popular and most disfavored 
litigants in the federal system. These decisions are missing, in part, because no 
one has cared to look for them—a reality that only underscores the need to 
 
208 He elaborates: 
[Systemic facts] are neither narrowly transactional, like adjudicative facts, nor foreign 
and external to the decisionmaker, like the archetypal legislative fact. . . . [They] 
account for information with respect to which a given decisionmaking institution enjoys 
deep institutional familiarity, privileged (or perhaps even exclusive) access, or both. 
Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, !$% HARV. 
L. REV. $"-%, $"'*-'( ($"!') 
209 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, && 
HARV. L. REV. )'-, -"$ (!%-$); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, && COLUM. L. REV. 
%-&, %&$ (!%&&) (explaining further the di#erence between legislative and adjudicative facts). 
“Adjudicative facts” concern the “immediate parties” and the events and circumstances of the case 
itself. Crespo, supra note $"(, at $"'' (internal quotation marks omitted). Legislative facts, on the 
other hand, are “general,” concerned with “social and economic data” about the world beyond 
courthouse wall, including, for example, facts about the “psychological e#ects of racial segregation 
on minorities,” the “relative safety of surgical procedures,” and the “sociological consequences of 
same-sex parenting.” Id. at $"'' (internal quotation marks omitted). 
210 Crespo, supra note $"(, at $"&$. 
211 Crespo’s work focuses on the capacity of criminal trial courts to marshal systemic facts in 
constitutional criminal adjudication to combat transactional myopia and enable criminal courts to 
achieve greater institutional awareness. See generally id. Crespo does suggest, however, that systemic 
factfinding “could illuminate important institutional attributes of . . . [the] courts themselves.” Id. at 
$!"! n.$$*. He offers two possibilities: “racial disparities related to the protocols [courts] use to 
compose jury venire pools, or [court] compliance with statutory or constitutional speedy trial 
guarantees.” Id. I use Crespo’s frame more generically here to refer to the body of data that courts as 
institutions acquire in processing any stream of cases—not just criminal cases and not just trial-level 
dispositions and processes. Appellate courts possess data capable of generating systemic facts, too. 
212 See generally Appendix A. 
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examine what the missing decisions themselves say about how the federal 
appellate system administers justice. 
The federal courts of appeals have been sorting their output in ways that 
promote and give greater access to decisions that impact the most powerful in 
our system: well-lawyered disputes involving complex and interesting legal 
questions end in easily accessible published opinions. That observation, as a 
general matter, is not new. More than twenty years ago, scholars exposed the 
creation of a two-tier system of appellate justice, which benefits the haves at 
the sake of the have-nots.213 In a capstone to the most probing work done to 
date on unpublished decisions, William Richman and William Reynolds 
observed: “Our thirty-plus years of study have left us with anger and despair 
over the creation and jealous maintenance of a system that underserves the 
nation and shortchanges the poor and powerless.”214 Penelope Pether similarly 
argued that “unpublication does the work of structural subordination.”215 
This Article underscores the urgency of these assertions and reveals our 
inability—at present—to evaluate these charges. It also raises the more troubling 
possibility that the courts have been complicit in—or, worse, perpetrators of—
systemic subordination. But we cannot investigate such a serious charge without 
easy and navigable access to the decisions that affect the system’s most vulnerable 
and least powerful. Earlier efforts to address these questions have been 
incomplete; we have always only seen about seventy percent of the canvas. 
The missing decisions likewise are relevant to assessing how sloppy some of the 
work of the federal appellate system has become.216 We’ve never had easy access to 
what are undoubtedly the poorest of the poor decisions, making any systemwide 
assessment of the quality of the courts’ work nearly impossible. The courts’ 
decisional procedures have enacted roadblocks—or at least speedbumps—to 
academic efforts to scrutinize and navigate the second tier of federal appellate 
process. Richman and Reynolds have warned that “the poor quality of so many 
unpublished opinions provides stark evidence that there has been a systemic 
 
213 Richman & Reynolds, supra note $%, at $*&-*' (describing two-tier system of federal 
appellate process); see also McAlister, supra note -), at &-*--( (discussing the two-tier system). 
214 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $", at ix. 
215 Pether, supra note $%, at !&$!. 
216 For example, Richman & Reynolds have noted that 
[i]n addition to the systemic and structural costs exacted by the courts’ strategy of reducing 
appellate process in order to accommodate caseload, there is a significant cost in quality as 
well . . . . Moreover, the poor quality of so many unpublished opinions provides stark 
evidence that there has been a systemic breakdown in the work product of the circuit courts. 
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $", at !$"-$!; see also McAlister, supra note -), at &)* (“[T]he 
creation of the unpublished decision has led to pervasive decisional atrophy—atrophy that has been 
lamented but largely unexamined.”). 
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breakdown in the work product of the circuit courts.”217 Navigable access is essential 
to any examination of the quality of the court’s work at an institutional level. 
Consider another way in which the missing decisions might serve as 
“systemic facts.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued 
a remarkable set of opinions in March #"!%,218 revealing profound internal 
disagreement over its publication practices for requests to ,le second or 
successive habeas petitions under #& U.S.C. § ##))(h) and § ##''.219 The 
controversy involved a high volume of petitions (over #,#"") seeking relief 
under Johnson v. United States,220 which had held a portion of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague, and under Welch v. United 
States,221 which had made Johnson fully retroactive. Apparently in an e-ort to 
regulate the practice within the Eleventh Circuit, panels began publishing 
decisions resolving certain of these requests.222 In the process, the court made 
law that bound future panels and, in the view of some members of the court, 
it did so undesirably and unfairly.223 These concerns were heightened because 
of the limited adversarial nature of the requests to ,le second or successive 
habeas petitions under § ##))(h) and § ##''(b).224 
 
217 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note $", at !$!. 
218 See United States v. St. Hubert, %!( F.)d !!*- (!!th Cir. $"!%) (en banc); id. at !!*- (Tjo.at, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at !!*% (Jordan, J., concurring in the denial of 
rehearing en banc); id. at !!%' (Wilson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 
!!%% (Martin, J. dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
219 Federal appellate courts may authorize the filing of second or successive habeas petitions when 
the petition raises a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” to the federal habeas petitioner. $( U.S.C. 
§ $$&&(h). To seek permission to file a successive petition under § $$&&(h), the habeas petitioner files a 
request in the applicable circuit court of appeals. § $$--(b)()). A three-judge panel reviews the request 
and grants permission for the filing “if [the panel] determines that the application makes a prima facie 
showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” § $$--(b)())(B)–(C). The 
court is supposed to act on the request within thirty days, § $$--(b)())(D), and the decision “shall not 
be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” § $$--(b)())(D)–(E). 
220 &*' U.S. &%!, &%*-%( ($"!&). 
221 !)' S. Ct. !$&* ($"!'). It is worth pointing out that the lower court’s decision in Welch was 
itself a “missing decision”—a single-judge order by a judge on the Eleventh Circuit denying a 
certi+cate of appealability. See Welch v. United States, No. !--!&*)) (!!th Cir. June %, $"!&). 
222 See St. Hubert, %!( F.)d at !!*% (Tjoflat, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In 
$"!' after the Johnson and Welch decisions, there was a heightened need to publish at least some of these 
$,$($ orders to establish precedent, to provide consistency in panel rulings in so many cases, and to 
facilitate the administration of these matters.”). Judge Tjoflat’s explanation as to the need for consistency 
in administering the requests likewise suggests the importance of navigable access to these decisions to 
enable the court, the public, and academics to evaluate the evenhanded administration of this process. 
223 See id. at !$"*-"( (Martin, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[I]t is not 
the number of published opinions I take issue with. I take issue with the practice itself. As Mr. St. 
Hubert’s case illustrates, any one published order that prematurely and in my view mistakenly 
resolves an open merits question forecloses that issue for all future panels.”). 
224 See id. at !$!" (explaining that published decisions on second or successive petitions did 
not have “the usual robust process that ordinarily attends our Circuit precedent”); see also id. at !!%! 
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Although the sharp disagreement among members of the court focused on 
the use of published orders to bind, lurking in the background was the specter 
of what had happened to the rest of the #,""" decisions that the court had not 
published. Indeed, we see a glimpse in Judge Beverly Martin’s dissent from the 
denial of rehearing en banc on the use of published orders: she discussed the 
case of Stoney Lester, whose request for permission to proceed with a 
successive petition had been granted in an unpublished order.225 There’s no 
commercial database citation for the Lester decision; it’s a missing decision. But 
Martin deploys it as a kind of systemic fact that would have been lost otherwise 
to those outside the court—that is, to those who had not been responsible 
(personally) for the court’s review of more than #,""" similar requests. She 
offered Mr. Lester’s case as an “example of . . . how our get-permission process 
should operate.”226 The irony should not be lost: the published decisions on the 
successive petitions approval process undesirably bound the Eleventh Circuit, 
some judges argued, while “missing decisions” were held up, instead, as 
compelling examples of how the process should have operated. 
Martin’s use of a missing decision to challenge her colleague’s approach to 
the second or successive process foreshadows an important objection to the 
solution discussed in the next Part. Some judges may ,nd strategic advantage 
in issuing decisions under the radar of disagreeing colleagues. Indeed, such 
decisions may serve valuable institutional aims, permitting panels, as I have 
explained, to “avoid”227 (temporarily or not) controversial or thorny issues 
over which there is only high-level agreement as to outcome.228 Exposing 
those decisions by making them widely and freely available might have 
unintended consequences and restrict appellate panels from doing justice 
when they are reluctant to make law. 
That argument should garner some sympathy; such use of unpublished 
decisions may be the least problematic for reasons discussed elsewhere.229 I 
 
(Jordan, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that court might decide such 
orders are binding “only when there has been adversarial brie+ng”). 
225 Id. at !$") (“I o#er the example of a case brought by a man named Stony Lester, because it 
illustrates how our get-permission process should operate. See In re Stoney Lester, No. !'-!!*)"-A, 
slip op [(May !%, $"!')]. Mr. Lester sought leave to +le a second or successive § $$&& motion in light 
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson.”). 
226 Id. 
227 See McAlister, supra note -), at &*- (explaining that “avoidant decisions” are “facially under-
reasoned decisions” that “bear[] the features of ordinary appellate process, including oral argument 
and counsel” but result in decisions that “say[] very little, and may slip below the radar” as 
“perfunctory unpublished decision[s]—perhaps precisely as the ‘avoidant’ panel intended”). 
“Avoidant” unpublished decisions usually involve thorny, novel, important, or complex issues over 
which there may be panel agreement as to outcome but not as to reasoning. Id. at &('. 
228 See id. at &((-(% (identifying “limited role for avoidant decisions” and “+nd[ing] room for 
some avoidant decisions in an unpublication scheme”). 
229 See id. at &('-(( (describing legitimate use of unpublished decisions to avoid issues). 
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do not argue here for a transparency mandate in reason giving—that is, that 
courts always explain themselves. Instead, I ask only that courts make their 
results easily and freely navigable. That more limited type of transparency 
does not require courts to abandon practices that may serve weighty 
institutional interests or permit case-speci,c decisions in the interests of 
justice. But we should have free and usable access to those results. Indeed, 
without it, instances where courts have employed corrective justice may lead 
to inconsistent and unfair justice. Why should one litigant bene,t from relief 
in strikingly similar circumstances and the other not have navigable access to 
that decision so that she may argue for the same result? 
Finally, this Article has largely assumed that decisions “go” missing—not 
that they are intentionally hidden by the courts or by the authoring judges. But 
what if that’s not the case? What if, instead, courts have developed a decisional 
issuance scheme that ensures that some decisions are harder to find, thus shaping 
public perception of the court’s work—whether by obscuring access to its most 
poorly reasoned work or, perhaps, by making certain classes of decisions harder 
to find (for example, cases like Jones and Bey)? That possibility echoes the 
concerns about judicial discretion—here deployed to make only certain decisions 
visible, depending on what kind of order the court uses to resolve the appeal—
that others have raised about the use of unpublished decisions to avoid 
establishing constitutional rights for civil rights plaintiffs.230 And were it true, it 
would only underscore the urgency of a solution, which I turn to next. 
IV. THE SOLUTION 
The problem of missing decisions has a solution within easy reach of both 
the commercial databases and the federal appellate courts. But, for reasons 
explained in this Part, the solution likely must come from the courts themselves. 
They are responsible for the scheme that limits free access to their decisional 
output on court websites. Although the courts may have been unaware of how 
that scheme affects navigable access to decisions in commercial databases, now 
that they are aware, the courts are in the best position to fix the problem. 
First, however, consider why commercial databases may not solve the 
problem of missing decisions on their own. Although the databases respond 
to consumer demand to add material, if I’m right that the class of “missing 
decisions” involves the least powerful and popular litigants, it seems highly 
unlikely that market forces will fix these access and navigation problems. The 
class of cases that are missing are not the ones that the highest paying users of 
 
230 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, '' EMORY L.J. &&, '$, 
!!&-!' ($"!') (+nding that nearly twenty percent of decisions recognizing new constitutional rights 
are unpublished and arguing that discretion with respect to the quali+ed immunity inquiry and the 
decision whether to publish leads to observable strategic behavior by appellate panels). 
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commercial databases—i.e., private attorneys and large law firms—usually are 
looking to retrieve.231 What’s missing are the decisions that the free or 
reduced-fee users of commercial databases are most likely to need or seek 
(including those working on behalf of criminal defendants in federal 
defenders’ offices, law clerks and court staff, other nonprofit lawyers, pro se 
litigants, and academics). The point is: the paying customers may not push the 
databases to incur costs to recover missing decisions, and their absence most 
significantly affects those who pay the least (or not at all) for access. The users 
most affected by the missing decisions are not those who can move the market. 
That said, the commercial databases of course could take signi,cant steps 
to address the problem—and I urge them to do so. That substantive decisions 
are missing may be deeply concerning; that the commercial databases who 
pro,t from their control of our law have not incurred the expense or 
undertaken the e-ort to ensure the completeness of their databases is also 
troubling. The debate over the wisdom and propriety of the commercial 
databases’ stranglehold on our law are beyond the scope of this work,232 but 
this Article o-ers yet another example of the costs of such a system. I hope 
my work may provide a template for how these databases can ensure that they 
recover what has been lost—at least going back to January !, #""*, the date 
after which all that is missing is usable as persuasive law in every circuit. 
For these reasons, the ,x likely must come from the courts. Not only are 
the courts best positioned to solve the problem, but they are also responsible 
for it. The courts have failed to live up to the promise of—and arguably failed 
to comply with—the E-Government Act itself. The Act left each federal 
court to fend for itself at the direction of its respective chief judge233—
inviting the kind of disparate schemes this Article identi,es.234 
 
231 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in A Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law Schools, 
and the Legal Information Market, !" LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. *%*, ()"-)! ($""') (“Lexis and Westlaw 
services are particularly suited to large law +rms that bill clients. The high costs of Lexis and 
Westlaw, however, means that users in certain market segments may not be able to pay the prices 
that Lexis and Westlaw charge under their traditional pricing models.”). 
232 See generally Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We Must Restore 
Public Ownership of Legal Publishing, $' J. INTELL. PROP. L. $"&, $"' ($"!%) (explaining how 
publication has merged with “ownership” of law in the United States and identifying harms from 
publishers’ use of “powerful legal tools to control who has access to the text of the law, how much 
they must pay, and under what terms”). 
233 -- U.S.C. § )&"! note (explaining that “[t]he Chief Justice . . . shall cause to be established and 
maintained, for the court of which the judge is chief justice or judge, a website” with written opinions). 
Chief judges—a rotating and temporary position, see $( U.S.C. § -&())(A)—are the “chief administrative 
leaders for their individual circuits.” Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, 
The Role and Impact of Chief Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, $- JUST. SYS. J. %!, %! ($"")). 
234 See Martin, supra note !', at )!) (tasking each chief judge with ensuring compliance “invited 
a wide range of methods and degrees of compliance”). 
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In the short term, I urge the Judicial Conference—the policy-making branch 
of the federal courts—to charge the Chief Judges of each circuit with ensuring free 
public access to all unsealed final, judge-issued decisions from the federal appellate 
courts.235 The Chief Justice of the United States chairs the Judicial Conference,236 
and he has initiated policy-reform efforts on the part of the Judicial Conference 
and the Administrative Office before.237 He has the power to do so again. 
The Judicial Conference also can ,x the problem of missing decisions by 
issuing new guidance that expansively construes the courts’ obligations under 
the E-Government Act. Wayward early guidance under the E-Government 
Act may be partly (or even entirely) to blame for missing decisions.238 That 
guidance essentially determined that the then-in-development PACER 
system “may be used to satisfy” the Act’s “searchability” requirement for 
access to the “substance” of court opinions.239 PACER, in turn, gives free 
access to certain court orders—but only those designated as “written 
opinions” consistent with the E-Government Act. 240 
 
235 This is not a new call—at least with respect to all unpublished decisions. Arthur Hellman 
persuasively argued to Congress nearly two decades ago that “all of the courts of appeals should 
make their unpublished dispositions available in electronic form to publishers and other information 
providers.” Hellman Statement, supra note &*. Regardless of whether the decisions are citable as 
precedent, Hellman explained, “the legal community and other citizens have a strong interest in 
knowing how the courts are carrying out their work of resolving disputes and applying the law.” Id. 
236 See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUST. OF THE U.S., $"!( YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at ' http://supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/$"!(year-endreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/)SFR-UVPF] [hereinafter $"!( YEAR-END REPORT] (explaining that the Chief 
Justice chairs the Judicial Conference of the United States). 
237 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUST. OF THE U.S., $"!* YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY, at !! http://supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/$"!*year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MY-B-SQ%E] (directing the “Director of the Administrative Office to assemble a working group to 
examine our practices and address [sexual harassment] issues”); see also $"!( YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 
$)', at '-* (describing Judicial Conference working group on sexual harassment policies). 
238 Memorandum from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Dir., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Regarding 
Compliance with Website Requirements of the E-Government Act, to All Chief Judges, U.S. Courts 
$ (Nov. !", $""-), http://www.access-to-law.com/pacer/AO_Mecham_memo_Nov$""-.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F(CR-UZAS] [hereinafter “Mecham Memorandum”] (clarifying the initial guidance 
on written opinions for the E-Government Act). 
239 Id. (“A combination of CM/ECF and the PACER systems may be used to satisfy the 
searchability requirement, as these systems allow for searching within a document.”). 
240 As Peter Martin has explained: 
In response to the E-Government Act, the Administrative O,ce of the U.S. Courts, 
operating under Judicial Conference guidance, issued a new version of the CM/ECF 
software that, once installed by a court, incorporated two changes that applied to all 
documents in its system tagged as a ‘written opinion.’ The +rst exempted all 
documents so designated from PACER fees. . . . [A] second and more important 
change to PACER was the addition of a ‘Written Opinions Report.’ This operates 
only at the individual court level. 
Martin, supra note !', at )$" 
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The “official guidance” left “written opinion” designation choices up to the 
“authoring judge”; she was responsible—through direction to a “user filing on 
behalf of a judge”—for determining whether a particular decision satisfied the 
Act’s “written opinion” threshold.241 On the one hand, the authoring judge was 
told that a “written opinion” was “any document issued by a judge or judges 
of the court, sitting in that capacity, that sets forth a reasoned explanation for 
a court’s decision.”242 On the other hand, for appellate courts, “only those 
documents designated as opinions of the court”—an undefined term—“meet 
the definition of ‘written opinion.’”243 Rather than mandate access to all final 
orders or opinions, or even just to all reasoned decisions, the Judicial 
Conference devolved these designation decisions to individual judges. 
Whatever hopes we may have had for the E-Government Act, individual 
compliance determinations and decisional issuance schemes have effectively 
thwarted widespread, free, and navigable access to all federal appellate decisions. 
How much each court makes available for free on its website is a decision left 
entirely to each individual court, authoring judge, or administrative clerk filing 
each respective decision. That must change to solve the problem of missing 
decisions, and updates to the #""' guidance is a good place to start.244 
Another solution would be to make PACER free; indeed, this work may 
provide yet another reason why PACER should be free and reformed for 
enhanced usability.245 But privacy issues related to personally sensitive 
information in court-,led documents loom large in that debate.246 My 
proposal, thus, is more narrowly drawn to avoid privacy concerns over 
 
241 Mecham Memorandum, supra note $)(, at ) (“CM/ECF will be modi+ed to ask a user +ling 
on behalf of a judge whether the document being +led meets the de+nition of ‘written opinion’ at 
the time of docketing in CM/ECF.”). 
242 Id. at $. The guidance clari+ed that “routine, non-substantive orders” were not “written 
opinions.” Id. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at ). 
245 As of February $"!%, Congress was considering bipartisan legislation to do away with 
PACER’s paywall. See Patrick L. Gregory, PACER’s Court Records Should Be Free Lawmakers Say, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. !), $"!%, &:"% PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/bipartisan-
bill-introduced-to-make-pacer-docs-free [https://perma.cc/$U*P-V&CR]; Seamus Hughes, The Federal 
Courts Are Running an Online Scam, POLITICO (Mar. $", $"!%), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/$"!%/")/$"/pacer-court-records-$$&($! [https://perma.cc/P-W*-M'PL]. 
Litigation over PACER’s fees and how the judiciary spends those fees is ongoing. See, e.g., Nat’l 
Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, $%! F. Supp. )d !$) (D.D.C. $"!() (holding that use of 
PACER fees to fund certain judiciary projects exceeded congressional authorization for use of fees), aff ’d 
%'( F.)d !)-", !)&" (Fed. Cir. $"$") (holding that fees must be limited to the expenses “incurred in services 
providing public access”); Perry Cooper, Federal Circuit Hammers Government on Use of PACER Fees, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. ), $"$", ):-* PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/federal-circuit-hammers-
government-on-use-of-pacer-fees [https://perma.cc/-RLV-LXFG]; Adam Liptak, Attacking a Pay Wall That 
Hides Public Court Filings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. -, $"!%), https://www.nytimes.com/$"!%/"$/"-/us/politics/pacer-
fees-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/YB-$-BDXY]. 
246 See, e.g., Schultze, supra note '*, at !$"&-"% (discussing privacy concerns with free PACER). 
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whether and how to free PACER from its restrictive paywall. I propose, 
instead, that the Judicial Conference issue guidance requiring courts to make 
all judge-issued unsealed decisions, which are already stripped of personally 
sensitive information, freely available on court websites. 
Why insist on access to all judge-issued ,nal decisions and not, more 
limitedly, all reasoned ,nal decisions? The discovery of missing decisions calls 
into question the courts’ ability to make slippery choices between what is 
reasoned and what is not. If the courts have decided that some decisions are 
simply not reasoned enough to be helpful to litigants, they are not careful in 
that inquiry if decisions like Jones v. Gelb slip through the cracks. Better to 
have access to all decisions; technology can separate wheat from cha-.247 
I would limit my proposal in one respect: courts need not make available all 
procedural terminations on court websites for free; they only need to ensure 
robust access to those procedural terminations that result from court, rather 
than clerk, action. Many procedural terminations may have little public value 
(for example, voluntary dismissals and dismissals for failure to prosecute).248 
For that reason, I propose requiring courts to make only judge-issued (as 
opposed to clerk-ordered) procedural terminations, which would include any 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, publicly and freely available. Judge-ordered 
terminations of all types should be available on court websites. 
There’s another reason to insist on broad free access—a reason that takes a 
less charitable view of the courts. It’s possible that the federal appellate court’s 
decisional scheme has developed by design. Some federal appellate judges 
expressed strong opposition to Rule (#.! and its liberalized reliance on 
unpublished decisions.249 Decisional issuance schemes—and the selective free 
access that they entail—may be the contemporary equivalent of a no-citation ban. 
Future work should plumb this issue. For now, fears of court complicity or, worse, 
court instigation, should strengthen the call for a broad free-access mandate. 
It also strengthens the call for congressional action. To ensure access to 
court decisions irrespective of any Judicial Conference action, Congress 
should consider legislation requiring free, public access in a keyword-
searchable form to all ,nal judicial decisions of the federal appellate courts. 
The Government Printing O+ce’s existing consolidated federal court 
 
247 See Martin, supra note $"", at -- (arguing that “[t]he rapid development of sophisticated Internet 
search tools provides strong evidence that with the right combination of public sector involvement and private 
sector competition in the dissemination of legal information, [information overload] need not occur”). 
248 See supra notes !"*–!!$ and accompanying text (discussing types of procedural terminations). 
249 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure "#.$, FED. 
LAW., June $""-, at )', )* (“When the people making the sausage [i.e., unpublished decisions] tell 
you it’s not safe for human consumption, it seems strange indeed to have a committee in Washington 
tell people to go ahead and eat it [i.e., cite to them] anyway.”). 
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opinions database, FDsys, could be used to provide that free, keyword-
searchable access to the work of the federal appellate courts. 
All of these solutions are not just technically feasible—indeed, the 
technical infrastructure already exists—but the federal courts make more than 
enough money o- of the PACER system fees to pay for these reforms.250 It 
is past time that the U.S. Courts of Appeals ensure meaningful, complete, 
and free access to their work product—to our law. 
CONCLUSION 
Core assumptions about our ability to use technology to access and 
navigate useful precedent from the federal appellate courts are not—and never 
have been—true. The courts are best positioned to eliminate accessibility and 
usability issues once and for all. Given the sophistication of technological tools 
to filter and isolate useful precedent, we should worry less about information 
overload and worry more about our ability to access, scrutinize, and use the 
entire work of the federal appellate courts. What’s missing may well affect 
those who litigate the most but who are the least likely to effect change in 
institutional design. Let this work be the beginning of the solution. 
  
 
250 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Paying for Public Records, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. !), $"!%, !!:!& AM), 
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/$"!%/"$/paying-for-public-records.html [https://perma.cc/
)GJ'-TPZC] (reporting that while PACER charges a fee of 0".!" per page, the estimated cost of retrieving 
a page is estimated to be “only 0".""""""' per page” and that PACER “brought in more than 0!-' million 
in fees during the $"!' fiscal year, even though it cost just over 0) million to operate” (quoting Corrected 
Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program, %'( F.)d !)-" (Fed. Cir. $"$") 
(Nos. !%-!"(!(L), !%-!"()); Matt Ford, The Courts Are Making a Killing on Public Records, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Jan. )!, $"!%), https://newrepublic.com/article/!&)"")/courts-making-killing-public-records-pacer-fees 
[https://perma.cc/A$VD-E*AK]). 
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APPENDIX A 
What follows are figures depicting (!) the maximum possible percentage 
of available merits terminations across all geographic federal appellate courts 
in each twelve-month period ending on September (" between #""& and #"!$; 
and (#) the maximum possible percentage of available merits terminations per 
circuit in each twelve-month period ending on September (" between #"!$ 
and #""&. Similar figures for the twelve-month period ending on September 
(", #"!& and September (", #"!* appear in the body of the Article. 
 
Figure !.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
Terminations for Each Database in "#!) 
 
 
Figure !.": Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
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Figure ".!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
Terminations in Each Database in "#!( 
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Figure &.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
Terminations in Each Database in "#!' 
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Figure '.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 
Terminations in Each Database in "#!& 
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Figure (.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in 
Each Database in "#!" 
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Figure ).!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in 
Each Database in "#!! 
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Figure %.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in 
Each Database in "#!# 
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Figure $.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in 
Each Database in "##* 
 
 
Figure $.": Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits 






































Lexis Westlaw Bloom. FDSys
!!*# University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !!"! 
Figure *.!: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in 
Each Database in "##$ 
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APPENDIX B 
What follows are two examples of “missing decisions” from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued during the #"!$ to #"!* 




United States Court of Appeals 














Torruella, Thompson, and Barron, 





Entered: July 10, 2017 
 
Defendant-appellant Angelita Bravo-García ("Bravo") was indicted for possession of 
ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  She pled guilty without 
a plea agreement.  Bravo's Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") established a Base Offense Level 
("BOL") of 20 for violating 18 U.S.C § 922 with a prior "controlled substance offense," pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (defining "controlled substance 
offense").  Her Total Offense Level was calculated to be 18, given a two-level decrease for 
acceptance of responsibility.  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); The PSR also assigned Bravo a Criminal 
History Category of III.  Combined, these gave Bravo an advisory Guidelines sentencing range 
of thirty-three to forty-one months of imprisonment. 
 
Bravo objected to the calculation of her BOL and challenges her sentence in this appeal, 
arguing that none of her prior convictions qualify as a "controlled substance offense" as defined 
by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) and that her sentence should not therefore be enhanced.1  Bravo argued 
                     
1  Bravo also argues that the district court erred in imposing a nighttime curfew and electronic 
monitoring for six months as special conditions of her supervised release.  Because we remand 
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